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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On February 6, 2001, Gus Boulis, a well-respected business tycoon, was 
gunned down in his car in Fort Lauderdale, Florida while driving away from 
a business meeting.1  Despite its high profile, the subsequent police 
investigation suffered from a lack of cooperation2 and a lack of physical 
evidence.3  The prosecutor gathered evidence for four years and finally 
charged three men with the murder.4  The three suspects have been awaiting 
trial for over five years, and a critical point of the pretrial wrangling has 
focused on the admissibility of two of the suspects’ cell phone records.5  
These records are crucial to the case because an analysis of the location data 
contained in them places two of the men within 500 feet of the murder as it 
was taking place.6  However, the defense challenged the admissibility of the 
records because the police obtained them without a warrant.7  The defense 
claimed this action violated defendants’ constitutional rights,8 but on 
February 24, 2011, a Florida judge refused to suppress the cell phone 
records, citing federal precedent that indicates cell phone users have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in location information gathered by the 
 
 1.  Paula McMahon, Judge OKs Crucial Evidence in Boulis Murder Case, SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 
24, 2011, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-02-24/news/fl-gus-boulis-case-cell-phone-20110224_ 
1_ferrari-and-fiorillo-james-pudgy-fiorillo-anthony-little-tony-ferrari. 
 2.  See Jeff Shields & Ardy Friedberg, Boulis Slaying Investigation Loses Impetus, SUN 
SENTINEL, Sept. 27, 2005, http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/local/southflorida/sfl-
927boulisimpetus,0,5933261.story.  After questioning Adam Kidan, a former business rival of 
Boulis, detectives from Fort Lauderdale admitted that they “[didn’t] feel he was totally candid with 
us.”  Id.  In addition, roughly a year after the murder, no one had come forward with any information 
leading to an arrest, despite the fact that a $100,000 reward was available for such information.  Id. 
 3.  McMahon, supra note 1. 
 4.  Barbara Hijek, Gus Boulis: Life, Violent Death and the Aftermath, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 13, 
2010, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-10-13/news/fl-boulis-trial-timeline-20101013_1_james-
pudgy-fiorillo-anthony-little-tony-ferrari-kidan-and-abramoff. 
 5.  See McMahon, supra note 1. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  See id. 
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police.9  The prosecutors in this case saw a major victory in this ruling, but 
did the privacy rights of all Americans suffer a defeat?10 
There are approximately 277 million active cell phones in the United 
States.11  Beyond the obvious purpose of making calls, newer cell phone 
models can provide a user with turn-by-turn driving directions, Internet 
browsing, and even movie rentals.12  Cell phone owners routinely make calls 
from locations that, at one time, would have been thought impossible.13  This 
technology has become so widespread that cell phones now seem equally 
indispensable for the average teenager and the traveling businessman.14  
However, some claim that cell phones also represent a serious threat to our 
constitutional right to privacy.15  Due in part to the relatively unobtrusive 
infrastructure of mobile networks,16 many people probably do not consider 
how this technology works or what information they may inadvertently be 
sharing with their cell phone company. 
 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  See id. 
 11.  Michael Isikoff, The Snitch in Your Pocket: Law Enforcement Is Tracking Americans’ Cell 
Phones in Real Time—Without the Benefit of a Warrant, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 2010, at 40. 
 12.  E.g., Alex Colon et al., Dragon Go! (for iPhone), PC MAGAZINE.COM (July 29, 2011), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2389440,00.asp; Sascha Segan, Motorola Droid 2 (Verizon 
Wireless), PC MAGAZINE.COM (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,23 
67795,00.asp. 
 13.  This newfound freedom of communication has had some unintended consequences.  For 
instance, hikers seeking to get away from the hustle and bustle of life in the city might find 
themselves surrounded by other hikers chatting away on their cell phones.  This danger is so 
prevalent that some hiking guides now outline cell phone usage guidelines as part of their discussion 
on “trail etiquette.”  See, e.g., DOUGLAS LORAIN, 100 CLASSIC HIKES IN OREGON: OREGON COAST, 
COLUMBIA GORGE, CASCADES, EASTERN OREGON, WALLOWAS 14 (2004). 
 14.  A recent study by the Pew Research Center found that seventy-five percent of children 
between the ages of twelve and seventeen own cell phones.  Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Cell Phones 
and Texting: Text Messaging Becomes Centerpiece Communication, PEWREASEARCHCENTER 
PUBL’NS (Apr. 20, 2010), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1572/teens-cell-phones-text-messages.  This 
is up from only forty-five percent in 2004.  Id.  While teenagers are probably using cell phones 
strictly for fun, a study released earlier this year found that an incredible 1.1 billion hours are saved 
by small businesses alone by utilizing applications on smartphones and tablets.  Jan Norman, Mobile 
Apps Save Small Firms 1.1 Billion Hours, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER: BUSINESS (June 6, 
2011, 6:00 AM), http://jan.ocregister.com/2011/06/06/mobile-apps-save-small-firms-1-1-billion-
hours/59961/.  This translates to about $17.6 billion in savings for small businesses (fewer than 
twenty employees) alone.  Id. 
 15.  See Isikoff, supra note 11, at 40. 
 16.  Because few people desire the “visual pollution” of plain, metal cell phone towers, 
companies construct camouflaged towers that look, at first glance, like trees, flag poles, chimneys, or 
other more visually appealing items.  The Early Show: Cell Phone Towers in Disguise (CBS 
television broadcast Nov. 29, 2009), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id= 
2214391n%3fsource=search. 
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Because of the sophisticated nature of mobile communications 
technology, the location of any cell phone, and presumably its owner, can 
often be easily determined within a few hundred feet.17  This location 
information, generally referred to as cell site location information (CSLI), 
has become a popular way for the government to combat criminal activity.18  
CSLI has been successfully used to catch murder suspects, drug traffickers, 
and other criminals.19  Some see CSLI as a powerful and necessary tool for 
law enforcement.20  Privacy advocates, however, find the use of these 
investigative tactics to evoke “Orwellian images of Big Brother,” and 
believe the practice of gathering such information without a warrant violates 
the Fourth Amendment.21 
Courts have not adequately addressed what, if any, constitutional 
protection CSLI deserves.22  Courts often distinguish between prospective 
(also known as “real-time”) CSLI and historical CSLI.  The former allows 
law enforcement to track a cell phone’s movements in real time, while the 
latter location information is from some time in the past and is gathered from 
cell phone records.23  Most jurisprudence in this area has focused on 
prospective CSLI, and although there is not a definitive answer on the issue, 
the acquisition of prospective CSLI by the government is generally thought 
to require a warrant.24  This is not the case for historical CSLI, access to 
which was routinely granted for years to government agencies without a 
warrant on a showing of less than probable cause.25  Recently, judicial 
attitudes seem to be shifting.26  Much has been written by judges, legal 
 
 17.  See infra notes 50–56 and accompanying text. 
 18.  See Isikoff, supra note 11, at 40.  In fact, it is estimated that mobile communications 
companies are receiving “thousands of [CSLI] requests per month.”  Id.  To streamline the process 
of dealing with this high volume of requests, Sprint Nextel has even admitted that the company has 
established a dedicated web site for law enforcement officials to log on and obtain CSLI from their 
offices.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  See infra notes 64–69 and accompanying text. 
 23.  See infra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 24.  In re the Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 595, 601 (W.D. Pa. 2008), 
vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter W.D. Pa. Opinion]. 
 25.  See Isikoff, supra note 11, at 40. 
 26.  Magistrate Judge James Orenstein was the first judge in the country to issue a published 
opinion denying an order for CSLI (either prospective or historical), and he did so in 2005.  In re an 
Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & 
Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &/or Cell Site Info., 384 F. Supp. 2d 
562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).  This decision marked a significant shift in jurisprudence not only because it 
was the first published decision denying such an order, but also because as Magistrate Judge 
Orenstein acknowledged in his opinion, he himself had been routinely granting requests for CSLI as 
recently as four months before he changed his mind in the instant case.  Id. at 566.  While Magistrate 
Judge Orenstein did not differentiate between historical and prospective CSLI, see id., it sparked a 
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scholars, and law students alike arguing that a probable cause standard 
should be applied to all applications for CSLI—historical or otherwise.27  
Concerns over privacy rights are not confined to judges and academics.  
Advocacy groups are devoting time and resources to fight for a probable 
cause standard and legislators are beginning to call for a change in the legal 
landscape of electronic privacy.28  However, in the ever-evolving and fast-
 
flood of opinions from judges all over the country, see In re the Application of the United States for 
an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, & (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info., 433 F. Supp. 2d 804, 804–05 (S.D. Tex. 2006) 
(listing opinions involving CSLI released in just the first year after Magistrate Judge Orenstein 
issued his opinion).  One of the earliest CSLI opinions indicated in dicta that the gathering of CSLI 
was not a violation of constitutional rights and fit comfortably within existing law.  See In re 
Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 
747, 759 n.16 (S.D. Tex. 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Texas Opinion] (“[H]istorical cell site data more 
comfortably fits the category of transactional records covered by the SCA.”).  Soon thereafter, a 
district judge in Indiana issued an opinion ruling that historical, as well as prospective, CSLI could 
not be obtained absent a warrant.  In re the Application of the United States for an Order: (1) 
Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; (2) Authorizing the 
Release of Subscriber & Other Info.; & (3) Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Based Servs. in 
re the Application of the United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a 
Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; (2) Authorizing the Release of Subscriber & Other Info.; and 
(3) Location of Cell Site Origination &/or Termination, Nos. 1:06-MC-6, 1:06-MC-7, 2006 WL 
1876847, at *1 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2006) [hereinafter Indiana Opinion] (“The Magistrate Judge 
described these two requests by stating that one seeks the ‘real time’ location of the cell phone(s) . . . 
while the second request seeks ‘historical’ cell site location information.  Either way, the 
Government is requesting an order requiring cellular phone companies to identify the specific cell 
tower from which a call originates, is maintained, or received for an incoming or outgoing call.  
And, as is detailed below, this Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that such information is 
unobtainable absent a warrant.”). 
 27.  See generally W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24, at 616; Patrick T. Chamberlain, Court 
Ordered Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Location Information: The Argument for a Probable 
Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745 (2009); Recent Development, Who Knows Where 
You’ve Been?  Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 316 (2004). 
 28.  For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation has an entire section of its website 
dedicated to “Cell Tracking.”  Cell Tracking, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/cell-tracking (last visited Dec. 22, 2011).  This portion of the website is 
replete with links to news articles, press releases, and amicus briefs filed by the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation in cases dealing with CSLI.  Id.  In addition, recently Senator Patrick Leahy is leading 
the charge to amend the Electronic Communications Privacy Act so as to provide stronger privacy 
protections for today’s cell phone and Internet users.  Declan McCullagh, Senator Renews Pledge to 
Update Digital-privacy Law, CNET (June 16, 2011, 11:39 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
31921_3-20071670-281/senator-renews-pledge-to-update-digital-privacy-law/.  The new law 
proposed by Senator Leahy would require the police to obtain a warrant before accessing private 
electronic communications or real time CSLI.  Id.  It is notable, however, that the subject of this 
Comment—historical CSLI—would not be affected by Senator Leahy’s proposal, because the 
existing statutory language that has been used to obtain historical CSLI without a showing of 
probable cause remains untouched.  See id. 
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paced world of technology, we should not be so quick to place further 
restrictions on access to historical CSLI.29  This Comment aims to clear up 
some of the current confusion surrounding historical CSLI.   
This Comment argues that law enforcement agencies should not be 
required to obtain a warrant to access records that contain historical CSLI, 
but rather should be able to gain access to them under the less stringent 
requirements outlined in the Stored Communications Act (SCA).30  Moving 
to a more restrictive standard could have a disastrous effect on the 
government’s ability to guard against threats to public safety.31  
Furthermore, by examining historical CSLI, law enforcement can rarely, if 
ever, intrude upon any person’s reasonable expectation of privacy because 
the laws and procedures currently in place do not, as some have suggested, 
pose a threat to our constitutional right to privacy. 
Part II of this Comment briefly explains cellular telephone technology 
and how CSLI is created, as well as differentiates between historical CSLI, 
which is the subject of this Comment, and real-time CSLI, which is much 
less controversial in the courts.  Part III discusses statutory and case law 
relevant to the gathering of historical CSLI.  Part IV examines the current 
state of the law, including the recent trend toward a probable cause standard 
to access historical CSLI, and the recent Third Circuit decision that declines 
to require such a standard.  Part V analyzes the proper standard and argues 
that the lesser standard enunciated in the SCA is the appropriate standard for 
historical CSLI.  Part VI discusses the impact of moving toward a warrant 
requirement and some of the harmful consequences that could arise from 
adopting a probable cause standard for law enforcement to obtain historical 
CSLI.  Part VII concludes. 
 
 29.  Some of the same features that worry privacy advocates make CSLI a “priceless 
investigative tool” for law enforcement.  Wesley Clark, Cell Phones as Tracking Devices, 41 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 1413, 1457 (2007).  First, whereas tracking devices are often hidden on a suspect’s car or 
other mode of transportation and thus cannot locate a person who uses a different means of 
conveyance, a cell phone often remains on a suspect’s person.  Id. at 1413.  Second, almost all adults 
in the United States own a cell phone.  Id.  Finally, using CSLI saves money, as there are no 
expensive devices that must be installed  to discover someone’s location.  Id. 
 30.  Under the SCA, the government may obtain records from a cell phone company upon a 
demonstration of “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the contents . . . records . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”  18 
U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006). 
 31.  See infra notes 303–12 and accompanying text. 
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II.  CELL SITE LOCATION INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PRIMER 
A.   Understanding CSLI: Cell Phone Technology 
Few people probably spend much time thinking about the infrastructure 
and technology that makes cell phones work because to use a cell phone, the 
regular consumer need not know any more than how to dial a phone 
number.32  The term “cell phone” is somewhat of a misnomer, as these 
devices are actually sophisticated radios that transmit sound through 
frequencies in much the same way that car radios do.33  Cell phones 
themselves only have a transmission and receiving range of about three to 
fifteen miles, so they use a vast and pervasive network of towers to receive 
and transmit signals between users.34  Each tower communicates only with 
the individual cell phones within its transmission range, which is referred to 
as a “cell.”35  Cells do not have a uniform size or shape due to interference 
caused by geographical abnormalities such as hills or buildings.36 
When a cell phone user places a call, a signal is transmitted to the 
closest cell tower, and then on to the cellular company’s mobile telephone 
 
 32.  In contrast to regular consumers, it is absolutely imperative that attorneys and judges 
practicing in this area understand how cell phones work and exactly what historical CSLI is before 
analyzing whether it warrants Fourth Amendment protections.  This section aims to provide a 
concise but complete and relevant description of cell phone technology as of the date of the 
Comment’s publication.  Technology evolves so quickly that even Supreme Court Justices 
occasionally display understandable, yet troubling deficiencies in necessary technological 
knowledge.  Last year, in a case involving violent video games, Justice Kennedy assumed that V-
Chips could be utilized by parents to keep kids from playing violent video games.  Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 24–25, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-
1448).  As the attorney in the case explained, V-Chips can block television programming only.  Id.  
Similarly, in another case argued last year, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia indicated 
that they believed text messages pass directly between two phones with no intermediary or third 
party delivery system.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 
(2010) (No. 08-1332).  Again, the attorney arguing the case was able to correct this 
misunderstanding and inform the Court that a text message must first pass through the phone 
company’s computer system before it is sent on to the recipient.  Id.  In both of these cases the 
attorneys involved were able to correct the Justices and prevent what could have been a 
misapplication of the law by the highest court in the land.  Misconceptions like these could lead 
well-meaning judges to come to unwarranted conclusions in all sorts of cases related to technology, 
and the following discussion is meant to help avoid such misunderstandings. 
 33.  Mark Davids et al., Teaching the Fundamentals of Cell Phones and Wireless 
Communications, 48 THE PHYSICS TEACHER 217, 217 (2010). 
 34.  KEN BALDAUF & RALPH M. STAIR, SUCCEEDING WITH TECHNOLOGY: COMPUTER SYSTEM 
CONCEPTS FOR REAL LIFE 273 (Marie Lee ed., 3d ed. 2009). 
 35.  GUY KLEMENS, THE CELL PHONE: THE HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE GADGET THAT 
CHANGED THE WORLD 54 (2010). 
 36.  Id. 
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switching office.37  From there, the signal is transferred to the recipient’s 
phone via landlines, other cellular transmission towers, or a combination of 
the two.38  Every cell phone has two unique numbers associated with it that 
are used to facilitate this connection.39  The first is called a Mobile 
Identification Number (MIN), which is simply the ten digit number dialed to 
connect with a particular cell phone user.40  The second is called an 
Electronic Serial Number (ESN).41  This number is unchangeable and is 
assigned to a particular phone by the mobile communications company that 
provides service to that phone.42  Whenever a call is made or received, a 
record of the call is created and held by the cell phone company, including 
the individual cell phones involved, those phones’ MINs and ESNs, and 
what cell towers each phone used to transmit the call.43 
Even when a cell phone is not making or receiving a call, it is still 
constantly communicating with the broader mobile network.44  About every 
seven seconds, a cell phone transmits its MIN and ESN to the nearest cell 
tower in a process called “registration.”45  While cell phones usually do the 
transmitting,46 the process can also work in reverse, and a cell tower can 
send a signal to a particular phone to determine from where that cell phone 
is broadcasting its signal.47  During registration, a cell phone shares its 
location with a cell tower so that the mobile carrier can quickly and 
efficiently route calls, and the tower also constantly shares valuable 
information with the cell phone.48  The only way to prevent a phone from 
registering itself is by turning it off.49  Hence, regardless of whether a cell 
phone is engaged in a call or simply sitting idle while powered on, it is 
 
 37.  DEBORAH MORLEY & CHARLES S. PARKER, UNDERSTANDING COMPUTERS: TODAY AND 
TOMORROW 299 (Marie Lee ed., 12th ed. 2008). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Recent Development, supra note 27, at 309. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24, at 590 & n.20. 
 44.  2005 Texas Opinion, supra note 26, at 751. 
 45.  W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24, at 590. 
 46.  Ricky G. Glover, A Probable Nightmare: Lifting the Fog from the Cellular Surveillance 
Statutory Catastrophe, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1543, 1549 (2007). 
 47.  See New York v. Hall, 823 N.Y.S.2d 334, 338 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (discussing the capacity of T-
Mobile, a cell phone company, to “ping” or send a signal to a cell phone that is powered on to 
determine, in general terms, where that particular phone is). 
 48.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL: PROCEDURES AND CASE 
LAW FORMS  40 (rev. ed. June 2005), available at https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ 
foia_ccips/20080123_esmanual.pdf (“This automatic registration with the nearest cell site is the 
means by which the cellular service provider connects with and identifies the account, knows where 
to send calls, and reports constantly to the customer’s telephone a read-out regarding the signal 
power, status and mode.”). 
 49.  See id. 
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inevitably (and necessarily) sharing some information about its location with 
a mobile communications company. 
The question naturally follows: exactly how much detail about a cell 
phone user’s location can be discovered by simply analyzing that user’s 
records?  Simply knowing which tower is communicating with a particular 
cell phone is conclusive evidence that a phone is somewhere within that cell 
tower’s broadcasting radius.50  However, by utilizing more sophisticated 
measurements taken at the time of transmission, a cell phone’s location may 
be triangulated51 and determined within 200 feet.52  The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) even requires that mobile 
communications companies have the ability to locate ninety-five percent of 
calls made to or from cell phones accurately within 300 meters or less using 
methods such as triangulation.53  If a cell phone is equipped with a GPS 
device, as almost all phones manufactured today are,54 the location of that 
phone could potentially be discerned as accurately as within fifty feet.55  
However, that is a best case scenario, and even with a GPS device, phones 
 
 50.  See Kevin McLaughlin, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location Tracking: Where 
Are We?, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 426 (2007).  As data is transmitted between cell 
phones and cell towers, the strength of the signal between the phone and the towers around that 
phone is measured.  Id.  When a cell phone user changes location, the transmitters recognize that the 
connection between the phone and its tower is diminishing, but if there is another tower that is 
receiving a stronger signal, the mobile telephone switching office will recognize this and cause the 
cell phone to switch frequencies and begin communicating with the new tower.  Id.  So, while a cell 
phone might transmit its signal to multiple cell towers within its range, it uses only a single cell 
tower to make or receive calls.  See id.  As discussed above, each cell tower has a transmission range 
of about three to fifteen miles, so any phone communicating with a given tower must be within that 
rather large transmission range.  See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
   51.  “Triangulation” is a “trigonometric operation for finding a position or location by means of 
bearings from two fixed points a known distance apart.”  Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/triangulation?show=0&t=1328408271 (last visited Feb. 
7, 2012).  Cell towers can be used as fixed points in order to triangulate a position. 
 52.  W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24, at 590.  One common method of determining location is 
called Time Distance of Arrival (TDOA), which refers to the process of measuring the time it takes 
for the signal from a phone to reach a tower.  McLaughlin, supra note 50, at 426.  Companies can 
also measure the angle between the origin of a signal and a cell phone tower.  Id.  This is called the 
Angle of Arrival Method (AOA).  Id. 
 53.  McLaughlin, supra note 50, at 426.  This requirement is meant to assist 911 operators in 
locating emergency calls when no location is verbally conveyed.  Id. 
 54.  Wireless Issues: Enhanced 911, VERIZON WIRELESS, http://aboutus.verizonwireless.com/ 
wirelessissues/enhanced911.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2011).  Every phone now sold by Verizon 
Wireless is GPS-enabled in order to comply with FCC mandates.  Id. 
 55.  McLaughlin, supra note 50, at 427.  Because of this increased accuracy, when a cell phone 
is equipped with a GPS device, the FCC mandates that companies be able to locate calls from that 
device within 150 meters.  Id. 
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can generally only be located within a range of 50 to 150 meters.56  
Although some courts have distinguished between information derived from 
a single tower, from multiple towers, or from GPS technology, any data that 
can be used to determine a phone’s location is collectively referred to as 
CSLI.57 
B.   Historical CSLI vs. Real Time CSLI 
There are two types of CSLI that law enforcement may request from cell 
phone companies.58  First, the government can request any records a 
company has kept containing CSLI.59  The records obtained under this 
method are referred to as historical CSLI.60  Second, they can request to 
view incoming CSLI as it is received from a user’s cell phone in “real 
time.”61  The information collected through this method is commonly termed 
prospective CSLI.62  A majority of courts that have considered applications 
for real-time CSLI have ruled that the information constitutes tracking 
information as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3117, which requires a warrant—and 
thus a showing of probable cause—before an order for disclosure of that 
CSLI may be granted.63 
However, the necessary standard for obtaining historical CSLI is much 
less certain.64  When law enforcement agencies request historical CSLI, they 
can determine the location of a cell phone only at some time in the past.65  
Unlike the real-time CSLI discussed above, this historical CSLI has often 
been thought to be governed by section 2703 of the SCA, which only 
requires a showing of “specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”66  Though this has long been 
 
 56.  Wireless Issues: Enhanced 911, supra note 54. 
 57.  2005 Texas Opinion, supra note 26, at 754. 
 58.  See infra notes 59–62. 
 59.  See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Allowable Use of Federal Pen Register and Trap and 
Trace Device to Trace Cell Phones and Internet Use, 15 A.L.R. FED. 2d 537 (2006). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  McLaughlin, supra note 50, at 431. 
 62.  Buckman, supra note 59. 
 63.  W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24, at 595, 601. 
 64.  See, e.g., 2005 Texas Opinion, supra note 26, at 748–49 (“The issue explored here has 
serious implications for the balance between privacy and law enforcement, and is a matter of first 
impression in this circuit as well as most others.”). 
 65.  In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of 
a Pen Register & a Caller Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. [SEALED] & [SEALED] & the Prod. of 
Real Time Cell Site Info., 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (D. Md. 2005). 
 66.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2009). 
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the prevailing interpretation among the courts,67 some judges have decided 
that even historical CSLI may only be obtained upon a showing of probable 
cause.68  Still others have ruled that no distinction should be made between 
historical and real-time CSLI, and that CSLI in any form requires probable 
cause.69  It is this ambiguity that this Comment is meant to alleviate, so it 
will focus heavily on the proper standard that should be applied to historical 
CSLI. 
III.   LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Due to the nature of modern communications systems such as cell phone 
networks and the Internet, users of these systems often must entrust personal 
information to the companies that provide these services.70  This creates 
privacy concerns because it is settled law that information voluntarily 
revealed to a third party is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.71  The 
laws and legal principles discussed below were created, in part, to safeguard 
the privacy of Americans.  However, these laws also attempt to provide law 
enforcement officers with the necessary tools and information to protect the 
general population.  This Comment asserts that the laws below create a 
workable legal standard that strikes the correct balance between individuals’ 
desire for privacy with the needs of law enforcement. 
A.   The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
 
 67.  See McLaughlin, supra note 50, at 432 (discussing historical CSLI and concluding that it 
“would not run afoul of the Court’s historical concerns with prospective surveillance”). 
 68.  See, e.g., W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24, at 595, 600 n.42. 
 69.  See, e.g., Indiana Opinion, supra note 26, at *1 (holding that neither of two different 
requests—one for historical CSLI and one for prospective CSLI—can be granted absent probable 
cause); In re Applications of the United States for Orders Authorizing the Disclosure of Cell Cite 
[sic] Info., Nos. 05-403, 05-404, 05-407, 05-408, 05-409, 05-410, 05-411, 2005 WL 3658531, at *1 
(D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2005) (ruling that no CSLI requests shall be granted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703). 
 70.  Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to 
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1210 (2004). 
 71.  See infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.  Accord United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 
443 (1976) (finding no expectation of privacy in information conveyed to third parties “even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed”); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 
(1973) (holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in documents turned over to an 
accountant for the purpose of preparing a tax return). 
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searches and seizures.”72  The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to 
“safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions 
by government officials.”73  Accordingly, when deciding whether a certain 
piece of information merits Fourth Amendment protection, a two-pronged 
test must be satisfied.74  The first prong requires that an “individual 
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the 
challenged search.”75  The second prong requires that “society [is] willing to 
recognize that expectation as reasonable.”76  Therefore, the question of 
whether the Fourth Amendment protects the location of a certain object or 
person is dependent upon the individual circumstances of each case.77 
The Supreme Court has often found occasion to take up questions 
involving the Fourth Amendment, and these cases provide a lens through 
which to view the gathering of historical CSLI.78  For example, in Smith v. 
Maryland, at the request of the police, a telephone company  installed a pen 
register (a device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone) in a 
suspected robber’s home without a warrant or court order.79  The 
information from the pen register allowed the police to obtain a search 
warrant for the suspect’s (Smith’s) apartment, which led to the discovery of 
more evidence used against Smith at trial.80  Smith challenged the 
warrantless installation of the pen register on his telephone by asserting that 
he had manifested an expectation of privacy by using the telephone “in his 
house to the exclusion of all others.”81  The Supreme Court ruled that a 
person holds no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed 
 
 72.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 73.  Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
 74.  California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”).  Katz 
makes it clear that a piece of information is only protected if someone intends it to be protected.  See 
id. 
 78.  While the Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled on the Fourth Amendment challenges to 
the warrantless gathering of CSLI, see Adam Koppel, Comment, Warranting a Warrant: Fourth 
Amendment Concerns Raised by Law Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone 
Tracking, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1080–83 (2010), several cases have dealt with issues essential 
to the analysis of the proper standard upon which police may obtain historical CSLI.  For example, 
Smith v. Maryland dealt with information voluntarily conveyed to a telephone company.  Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).  United States v. Knotts analyzed Fourth Amendment concerns 
surrounding remote electronic surveillance of persons traveling on public roadways and visible from 
public places.  United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983).  Finally, United States v. Karo 
determined issues surrounding the remote electronic surveillance of person inside a private 
residence.  United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984).  Each of these cases and the holdings 
are discussed in greater detail below.  See infra notes 79–98. 
 79.  Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 743. 
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from a home telephone, and thus the collection of such evidence by the 
government does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.82  
The Court further stated that even though Smith was in his own home, the 
location where a call is placed should not be considered in determining 
whether the caller retains any expectation of privacy in the dialed numbers.83 
The Court later decided two cases, United States v. Knotts84 and United 
States v. Karo,85 that both may aide in determining when a person possesses 
a reasonable expectation of privacy as to his or her location.86  These cases 
are especially apt when discussing historical CSLI because they dealt with a 
technology that many critics of the current interpretation of the SCA 
compare to cell phones: tracking devices.87 
In Knotts, police officers became suspicious that a man named 
Armstrong was purchasing chloroform to produce illicit drugs.88  With the 
consent of the company selling the chloroform, police placed a beeper (a 
type of tracking device) inside barrels containing Armstrong’s next 
purchase.89  After Armstrong picked up the chloroform, police used both 
visual surveillance and the beeper’s signal to discover Armstrong’s presence 
at a cabin in Wisconsin that contained a makeshift drug laboratory.90  In a 
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the police did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment by monitoring the beeper’s signal to locate the 
suspect because during the entire time he was being monitored, the suspect 
was either traveling on public roads or was clearly visible from the vantage 
 
 82.  Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 6, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (No. 78-5374)).  
The Supreme Court stated that because the information (dialed numbers) had been “voluntarily 
conveyed” to the phone company, Smith had “assumed the risk” that the phone company would 
disclose the same information to the police.  Id. at 745.  Thus, because of this risk, Smith could have 
no reasonable expectation that the numbers he had dialed would remain private.  Id.  This analysis 
remained true, the Court said, even though the telephone system was completely automated, and no 
human operator had connected the calls.  Id. 
 83.  Id.  Smith argued that because he used the telephone in his private residence, he 
“demonstrated an expectation of privacy by his own conduct.”  Id. at 743.  The Court speculated that 
his “conduct may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversation private,” but this was 
immaterial to an analysis of whether a dialed number may be obtained, because, regardless of a 
person’s location, that person must “convey that number to the telephone company in precisely the 
same way if he wished to complete his call.”  Id. 
 84.  460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 85.  468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 86.  See infra notes 88–98. 
 87.  See infra notes 88–98. 
 88.  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 278–79. 
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point of a public place.91  In arriving at this conclusion, the Court reasoned 
that the circumstances under which the beeper was used provided roughly 
the same information to the police that a patrol car following the suspect 
could have.92  In other words, the suspect had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the location of the chloroform while it was traveling in a truck on 
the public roadways, or while it was clearly visible outside the suspect’s 
private residence.93 
In Karo, police planted a beeper (the same type of tracking device used 
in Knotts) in a can of ether purchased for the purpose of extracting cocaine 
from clothing smuggled into the country.94  Using both visual surveillance 
and the beeper’s signal, the police followed the can of ether to the house of 
one of the defendants in the case.95  The cans of ether were moved three 
 
 91.  Id. at 281–82, 285.  Although this was a unanimous decision, three concurring opinions were 
filed, indicating differences of opinion in the reasoning that should be used to arrive at the result.  
See id. at 285–88.  Also, the issue in this case was notably confined only to whether the monitoring 
of the beeper was constitutional.  Id. at 279.  Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, indicated 
that this “would have been a much more difficult case if respondent had challenged, not merely 
certain aspects of the monitoring of the beeper installed in the chloroform container purchased by 
respondent’s compatriot, but also its original installation.”  Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
However, for the purposes of this Comment, the issue of installation is irrelevant, as obtaining 
historical CSLI requires no special equipment and does not even require any physical proximity to a 
particular cell phone.  See In re Applications of the United States for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, 
U.S. Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 n.11 (D. Mass. 2007) (“The ‘tracking’ of a cell 
phone does not require the installation of any sort of device.”). 
 92.  See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282 (“The fact that the officers in this case relied not only on visual 
surveillance, but also on the use of the beeper to signal the presence of Petschen’s automobile to the 
police receiver, does not alter the situation.  Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police 
from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as 
science and technology afforded them in this case.”). 
 93.  See id.  The Court indicated that the “open fields” doctrine applied.  Id.  Simply put, this 
doctrine dictates that “the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in 
their ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields.”  Hester v. United 
States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).  As it is used here, the term “open fields” simply refers to “any 
unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage” of a home.  Oliver v. United States, 466 
U.S. 170, 180 n.11 (1984).  Thus, “[a]n open field need be neither ‘open’ nor a ‘field’ as those terms 
are used in common speech.”  Id.  Justice Blackmun challenged the applicability of this doctrine to 
the Knotts case.  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 287 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“For me, the present case does 
not concern the open fields doctrine, and I regard these references and citations as unnecessary for 
the Court’s decision.”).  Regardless of whether the open fields doctrine applies to this particular 
case, it does provide one important insight into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: constitutional 
protections will not attach to an object simply because it is on private rather than public property.  
See id. at 285 (majority opinion) (“[N]otions of physical trespass based on the law of real property 
were not dispositive in Katz . . . .”); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (“[C]ourts have extended Fourth 
Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the curtilage, as did the common law, 
by reference to the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect that an area 
immediately adjacent to the home will remain private.  Conversely, the common law implies, as we 
reaffirm today, that no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 94.  United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984). 
 95.  Id. at 708–10. 
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times to three different houses completely undetected by the visual 
surveillance of any police officers, but were located after each move had 
been completed by the sole use and monitoring of the beeper.96  This case 
differed from Knotts in that the police used the beeper to determine the 
location of the bugged barrel of ether while it was inside a private residence 
and removed entirely from public view, not while it was in a public place or 
visible to public view.97  This distinction caused the Supreme Court to rule 
that this warrantless use of a tracking device was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.98 
The critical difference between Knotts and Karo was not how the 
location information was ascertained, but rather where the beepers were 
while broadcasting their location to the police.99  The Court recognized in 
Karo that electronic devices such as beepers could be used to discover facts 
that “the Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could 
not have otherwise obtained without a warrant.”100  Thus, a critical question 
to consider when analyzing electronic surveillance cases is what kind of 
information can be collected and whether that sort of information would be 
 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 714. 
 98.  See id. at 718.  The following passage from Karo has particular significance to this 
Comment, as it is perhaps the largest hurdle to overcome in arguing that the warrantless gathering of 
historical CSLI is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment: 
   We cannot accept the Government’s contention that it should be completely free from 
the constraints of the Fourth Amendment to determine by means of an electronic device, 
without a warrant and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a 
particular article—or a person, for that matter—is in an individual’s home at a particular 
time.  Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view 
would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely 
some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight. 
Id. at 716 (emphasis added).  This Comment argues that a warrant should not be required to access 
historical CSLI, which seems to be the type of indiscriminate monitoring that Karo was concerned 
about.  This does not end the matter, however, because in her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor 
tempered the strong and definitive tone of this assertion when she said: 
   As a threshold matter it is clear that the mere presence of electronic equipment inside 
a home, transmitting information to government agents outside, does not, in and of itself, 
infringe on legitimate expectations of privacy of all who have an expectation of privacy 
in the home itself. . . . We must therefore look for something more before concluding that 
monitoring of a beeper in a closed container that is brought into a home violates the 
homeowner’s reasonable expectations of privacy. 
Id. at 722–23 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Similarly, courts 
should look for “something more” before concluding that all warrantless gathering of historical 
CSLI constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
 99.  See id. at 715 (majority opinion). 
 100.  Id. 
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freely available to, say, a passerby.101  The fact that the information is 
gathered surreptitiously by electronic surveillance might make it seem 
improper, but, the Supreme Court spoke very clearly to the legality of such 
surveillance techniques when it said, “[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment 
prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon 
them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded 
them in this case.”102  Due in part to advances in technology, Congress has 
occasionally stepped in with legislation aimed at providing Americans with 
protections beyond those provided by the Constitution. 
B.   The Stored Communications Act 
The SCA103 was passed in 1986 as part of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986.104 In response to privacy concerns 
surrounding the advancement of communications technology, Congress 
enacted the SCA to provide some statutory protection of personal 
information where traditional Fourth Amendment protections were 
lacking.105  The SCA does two important things to protect information.  
First, it limits the government’s ability to compel private communications 
companies to disclose information about subscribers.106  Second, it limits a 
 
 101.  For example, Knotts focused on what it was the police learned by monitoring the beeper and 
came to the following conclusion: 
   A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.  When Petschen 
traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the 
fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of 
whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from public 
roads onto private property. 
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983).  Note that the Court is focused on the 
traveler’s actions, and not the police’s actions.  See id.  Presumably, had the same information been 
gathered from the traveler’s cell phone rather than a beeper, the Court would have come to the same 
conclusion. 
 102.  Id. at 282 (emphasis added).  A similar sentiment appears in Smith v. Maryland, in which the 
petitioner argued that because his phone call was connected through an automated service rather than 
a live operator, the number he dialed was not voluntarily shared by him and thus deserved 
constitutional protection.  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1979).  The Court 
dismissed this argument, stating “[w]e are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional result is 
required because the telephone company has decided to automate.”  Id. 
 103.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2710 (2006). 
 104.  The SCA is contained in Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 105.  Kerr, supra note 70, at 1212. 
 106.  18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006) (detailing the evidentiary standard that must be met to obtain 
certain types of information from companies).  Prior to the passing of the SCA, the government 
likely could have obtained personal subscriber information (such as e-mails) from companies simply 
by issuing a subpoena.  See Kerr, supra note 70, at 1213.  Though the protections provided by the 
SCA are not always as strong as those provided by the Fourth Amendment, it does provide greater 
protection than consumers had prior to its passing.  Id. 
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private company’s ability to voluntarily turn over information about a 
subscriber to the government.107 
The SCA is a relatively narrow statute, and it only protects information 
held by two specific types of service providers.108  The first type of provider 
is an electronic communication service (ECS), which is defined as “any 
service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or 
electronic communications.”109  The second provider is a remote computing 
service (RCS), which refers to “computer storage or processing services by 
means of an electronic communications system.”110  The distinction between 
an ECS and an RCS at times seems confusing or even arbitrary, but for the 
purpose of this Comment, a lengthy discussion of differentiating 
characteristics is unnecessary.111  This is because a single provision of the 
SCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), grants the authority and outlines the procedures 
by which government officials may require historical CSLI to be disclosed 
by providers of either an ECS or an RCS.112  For the sake of clarity, 
however, even though cell phone companies may act as both an ECS and an 
 
 107.  Kerr, supra note 70, at 1213.  The SCA contains a general prohibition against private 
companies disclosing records of their subscribers to governments, but then provides exceptions 
under which disclosure is proper.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006). 
 108.  Kerr, supra note 70. 
 109.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006). 
 110.  Id. § 2711(2).  An electronic communications system (not to be confused with an electronic 
communication service) is “any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic 
facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any computer facilities or 
related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such communications.”  Id. § 2510(14). 
 111.  Kerr, supra note 70, at 1215–16 (“The classifications of ECS and RCS are context sensitive: 
the key is the provider’s role with respect to a particular copy of a particular communication, rather 
than the provider’s status in the abstract.  A provider can act as an RCS with respect to some 
communications, an ECS with respect to other communications, and neither an RCS nor an ECS 
with respect to other communications.  In the case of a public provider, for example, files held in 
intermediate ‘electronic storage’ are protected under the ECS rules; meanwhile, files held for long-
term storage by that same provider are protected by the RCS rules.”). 
 112.  18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006).  The authority to compel disclosure granted by this section of the 
SCA is limited and specifically excludes the contents of any communications—such as a voice 
recording of a phone call or the text of an e-mail.  Id. 
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RCS,113 they are almost certainly acting as providers of ECS when they 
gather historical CSLI.114 
The SCA provides a number of avenues through which the government 
can seek records from an ECS or an RCS.115  The two options most relevant 
to this Comment are to obtain a warrant or to obtain a court order pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).116  In stark contrast with the standard necessary to 
obtain a warrant (probable cause),117 section 2703(d) only requires law 
enforcement to offer “specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”118  Because these two options 
are presented in the SCA, courts have often suggested it is permissible for 
law enforcement officials seeking historical CSLI to choose the less 
stringent of these standards and obtain court orders by satisfying only the 
“specific and articulable facts” standard outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).119  
While these sections of the SCA focus on when law enforcement can request 
information from companies, the legislation discussed in the next sections 
helps ensure that companies are retaining the type of information law 
enforcement might find useful. 
 
 113.  Kerr, supra note 70, at 1215 (“[M]ost network service providers are multifunctional.  They 
can act as providers of ECS in some contexts, providers of RCS in other contexts, and as neither in 
some contexts as well. . . . The classifications of ECS and RCS are context sensitive: the key is the 
provider’s role with respect to a particular copy of a particular communication, rather than the 
provider’s status in the abstract.”). 
 114.  See In re Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location 
Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Cell phone service 
providers clearly fit within [the definition of an ECS].”). 
 115.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2006).  According to the law, the government may require disclosure 
from an ECS or RCS when they (1) obtain a warrant, (2) obtain a court order, (3) obtain consent 
from a customer or subscriber, or (4) use a formal written request for basic contact information for a 
customer or subscriber suspected of telemarketing fraud.  Id. § 2703(c)(1)(A)–(D). 
 116.  Id. § 2703(c)(1)(A)–(B).  Cell phone records, including historical CSLI, may also be 
obtained by the government if the government has the consent of the subscriber or in special cases 
dealing with telemarketing fraud.  Id. § 2703(c)(1)(C)–(D). 
 117.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 118.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006). 
 119.  See, e.g., In re Applications of the United States for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, 
Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D. Mass. 2007) (“Because historical cell site information 
clearly satisfies each of the three definitional requirements of section 2703(c), a section 2703(d) 
order requiring the disclosure of historical cell site information may issue on a showing of ‘specific 
and articulable facts’ and no more.”); In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 303 n.6 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (asserting in dicta that 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) “plainly allows” the government to 
request historical CSLI); 2005 Texas Opinion, supra note 26, at 759 n.16 (“[H]istorical cell site data 
more comfortably fits the category of transactional records covered by the SCA.  Cell phone 
companies might legitimately compile such data for customized marketing and billing purposes.”). 
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C.   The Communications for Assistance of Law Enforcement Act 
The Communications for Assistance of Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) 
was passed in 1994.120  Simply, CALEA defines the scope and limits of the 
duty of companies to cooperate with the government in intercepting 
communications.121  CALEA requires communications service providers to 
implement their services in a way that will allow the government to later 
intercept or otherwise access “all wire and electronic communications 
carried by the carrier within a service area to or from equipment.”122  To 
access particular wire or electronic communications, law enforcement 
officials must have the proper authority—such as a warrant or a court 
order—and communications providers are tasked with the responsibility of 
making their systems secure from unauthorized access by law 
enforcement.123  Likely in response to concerns over the government’s 
power to misuse information received from communications companies,124 
the CALEA expressly forbids companies from turning over “call-identifying 
information” in such a way as to indicate the physical location of a 
subscriber.125  However, this only applies when the government is acting 
“solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace 
devices.”126  Legislation governing these devices is discussed next. 
D.   The Pen Register Statute 
The Pen Register Statute127 was passed in 1986 and, along with the 
SCA, forms part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.128  A pen 
 
 120.  Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Construction and Application of Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 to 1010, 25 A.L.R. FED. 2d 323, 
323 (2008). 
 121.  Id. at 333. 
 122.  47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1)–(4) (2006). 
 123.  See id. § 1004 (“A telecommunications carrier shall ensure that any interception of 
communications or access to call-identifying information effected within its switching premises can 
be activated only in accordance with a court order or other lawful authorization and with the 
affirmative intervention of an individual officer . . . acting in accordance with regulations . . . .”). 
 124.  See W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24, at 596–98 (recounting testimony given to Congress 
addressing the concern that “law enforcement could obtain—by CSLI—information of an 
individual’s physical movement previously obtainable only through visual surveillance or the covert 
installation of a radio-wave transmitter”). 
 125.  47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006). 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2006). 
 128.  Buckman, supra note 59. 
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register is “a mechanical device that logs dialed telephone numbers” without 
recording the content of the conversation.129  While pen registers monitor the 
phone numbers dialed for outgoing calls, trap and trace devices identify the 
phone numbers of incoming calls.130  The Pen Register Act outlines the 
conditions under which the government may use a pen register or trap and 
trace device.131  When this law was originally passed, the definitions of a pen 
register and a trap and trace device were relatively narrow, applying only to 
devices used on telephones.132  However, that definition was significantly 
broadened in 2001 with the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act133 to include 
in its application not only telephones, but information from any “wire or 
electronic communication.”134 
Because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith v. Maryland135 that 
numbers dialed on a telephone do not warrant Fourth Amendment 
protection,136 the standard of proof that law enforcement officials must meet 
in order to install a pen register or trap and trace device is quite low.137  To 
install either of these devices, government officials only need to show that 
“the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant 
to an ongoing criminal investigation.”138 
 
 129.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1248 (9th ed. 2009). 
 130.  Buckman, supra note 59. 
 131.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2006). 
 132.  18 U.S.C. § 3127 (2000) (amended 2001).  In the original version of the Pen Register 
Statute, a “pen register” was defined as “a device which records or decodes electronic or other 
impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which 
such device is attached.”  Id.  A “trap and trace device” was defined as “a device which captures the 
incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number of an instrument or 
device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted.”  Id. § 3127(4). 
 133.  See Buckman, supra note 59.  Today, a pen register is defined as “a device or process which 
records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an 
instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted,” and a trap and 
trace device is defined as “a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other 
impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling 
information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3127(3)–(4) (2006). 
 134.  18 U.S.C. § 3127 (2006).  The USA PATRIOT Act’s amendment gave the Pen Register 
Statute a violent shove into the twenty-first century, and, in so doing, ensured that the government 
could utilize pen registers and trap and trace devices not only on telephones, but also on cell phones 
and even personal computers.  Susan W. Dean, Comment, Government Surveillance of Internet 
Communications: Pen Register and Trap and Trace Law Under the Patriot Act, 5 TUL. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 97, 101 (2003). 
 135.  442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 136.  See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 137.  Buckman, supra note 59. 
 138.  18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (2006). 
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IV.   THE PUSH FOR A PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD 
Courts began publishing opinions regarding issues surrounding CSLI in 
2005.139  While courts are still divided as to whether real-time CSLI may be 
obtained by a showing of less than probable cause,140 there have been 
relatively few cases that have taken up the issues surrounding purely 
historical CSLI.141  Over the last several years, the prevailing view among 
the courts was that historical CSLI was governed by the SCA and thus could 
be obtained without a warrant pursuant to an 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) order.142  
Furthermore, the use of historical CSLI in criminal investigations is a 
common practice among law enforcement agencies all over the country.143 
In 2008, Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan of the Western District of 
Pennsylvania wrote a lengthy denial of an application to compel a cell phone 
service provider to disclose historical CSLI.144  In her opinion, Judge 
Lenihan concluded in unequivocal terms that “mandating a cell phone 
service provider’s covert disclosure of individual subscribers’ . . . physical 
location information must be accompanied by a showing of probable 
 
 139.  See supra note 26. 
 140.  See Koppel, supra note 78, at 1080–83 (citing, among others, In re Application of the United 
States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 
2d 448, 460–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (requiring less than probable cause); In re an Application of the 
United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &/or Cell Site Info., 384 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(requiring probable cause)). 
 141.  W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24, at 599–600. 
 142.  See, e.g., 2005 Texas Opinion, supra note 26, at 748–49.  It is difficult if not impossible to 
know exactly how often requests for historical CSLI are granted, because the opinions granting or 
denying these requests are often sealed.  Id. at 748.  However, the court here described the 
government’s choice to combine a request for historical CSLI records with a request for a pen 
register and trap and trace device as “standard practice.”  Id. at 749.  Furthermore, in this case, the 
court had already granted the government’s request for historical CSLI without issuing a public 
opinion.  Id. at 748. 
 143.  Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in Support of Affirmance of the 
District Court at 15, In re the Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of 
Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585 (2008) (No. 08-4227) 
(“FBI Special Agent and CSLI expert William Shute testified that he has used historical cell site 
information to locate fugitives almost 150 times.”).  See, e.g., Christian Nolan, Can Your Cell Phone 
Put You in a Cell Block?, LAW TECHNOLOGY NEWS (July 7, 2010), http://www.law.com/ 
jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202463302148 (stating that federal officials, while 
investigating four bank robberies, “obtained the [historical CSLI] and phone records of 169 cell 
phone numbers from nine separate providers”). 
 144.  W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24. 
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cause.”145  The court reasoned that the technology used to gather CSLI has 
essentially made cell phones indistinguishable from tracking devices.146 
This case is particularly noteworthy because, in an exceedingly rare 
show of solidarity, all four of the other magistrate judges in the Western 
District of Pennsylvania joined in the opinion.147  Though the court’s opinion 
was reversed on appeal,148 it represents a growing consensus among judges 
that historical CSLI deserves Fourth Amendment protection.149 
After Judge Lenihan issued her opinion in 2008, the Third Circuit took 
up the appeal and became the first federal appeals court to consider whether 
a warrant is required for the government to order disclosure of historical 
CSLI.150  The Third Circuit quickly dismissed the district court’s contention 
that cell phones are tracking devices by pointing out that the historical CSLI 
records sought were actually derived from a wire communication and not an 
electronic communication.151  This is significant because while tracking 
devices are excluded from the definition of electronic communications, they 
 
 145.  Id. at 586. 
 146.  Id. at 602 (“[O]ur cell phones, whenever on, broadcast this information virtually 
continuously as we go about from place to place.  Even without triangulation, our cell phones 
transmit . . . information of our movements to a few hundred feet.  It is, therefore, extremely difficult 
to see how a cell phone is not now precisely an ‘electronic . . . device which permits the tracking of 
the movement of a person or object.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3119(b) (2006)). 
 147.  See id. at 616.  On appeal, the Third Circuit noted: 
[T]he [Magistrate Judge’s] opinion was joined by the other magistrate judges in that 
district.  This is unique in the author’s experience of more than three decades on this 
court and demonstrates the impressive level of support Magistrate Judge Lenihan’s 
opinion has among her colleagues who, after all, routinely issue warrants authorizing 
searches and production of documents. 
In re the Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. 
to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Third Circuit 
Opinion]. 
 148.  Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 147, at 319. 
 149.  This growing consensus is evidenced by the fact that even while the Third Circuit was 
considering its appeal, Magistrate Judge Lenihan’s opinion was cited with approval by a court in 
Texas.  In re the Application of the United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen 
Register & Trap & Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Information; & (3) 
Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Based Servs., 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 584 n.21 (W.D. Tex. 
2010) [hereinafter 2010 Texas Opinion]. 
 150.  Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 147, at 306. 
 151.  Id. at 310.  A wire communication is defined as: “[A]ny aural transfer made in whole or in 
part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or 
other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of 
such connection in a switching station).”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2006) (emphasis added).  A cell 
tower collected the information sought in this case (and likely numerous other historical CSLI 
requests) only when a call was made.  Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 147, at 310.  Cell towers are 
essentially switching stations for phone calls, and thus the historical CSLI in this case fit squarely 
within the definition of a wire transfer.  See supra note 37 and accompanying text.  See also infra 
notes 189–221 and accompanying text for a more detailed analysis of this issue. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/14/2012  2:28 PM 
[Vol. 39: 701, 2012] Warrantless Cell Phone Location Gathering 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
723 
are not excluded from the definition of wire communications.152  By 
correctly classifying cell phone calls as wire communications, the court 
ruled that whether a cell phone is a tracking device was “irrelevant” to this 
case because the SCA does not prohibit the gathering of CSLI from tracking 
devices, as long as the tracking devices are wire communications.153 
The Third Circuit did not reject the argument that cell phones may at 
times resemble tracking devices.154  However, it did reject the notion that 
“CSLI by definition should be considered information from a tracking 
device that, for that reason, requires probable cause for its production.”155  
Accordingly, the court strongly and definitively stated that “CSLI from cell 
phone calls is obtainable under a § 2703(d) order and that such an order does 
not require the traditional probable cause determination.”156  However, the 
fact remains that the SCA provides two paths to obtaining historical CSLI: 
(1) a § 2703(d) order, and, (2) a warrant.157  The Third Circuit was “stymied” 
by the lack of any clear indication by Congress in the text of the SCA for 
when law enforcement should obtain a § 2703(d) order and when they must 
obtain a warrant.158  The court did little to alleviate this uncertainty and ruled 
that it was within a trial court’s discretion whether or not to require a 
warrant when applications for historical CSLI are presented to them, but that 
the option to require a warrant should be used “sparingly.”159 
Because it was the first circuit court to address the issue of historical 
CSLI, the Third Circuit’s decision will likely guide future courts in 
analyzing this important issue.160  The next section will focus on a question 
that the Third Circuit left to the discretion of the trial court judge: When 
does an order to compel the disclosure of historical CSLI deserve the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment?161 
 
 152.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (12) (2006).  A more comprehensive analysis of this issue appears 
below.  See infra notes 191–215. 
  153.  See Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 147, at 310. 
 154.  Id. at 312. 
 155.  Id. at 313. 
 156.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 157.  Id. at 319. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  See id. (“Because the statute as presently written gives the MJ the option to require a warrant 
showing probable cause, we are unwilling to remove that option although it is an option to be used 
sparingly because Congress also included the option of a § 2703(d) order.”). 
 160.  See id. at 305–06.  The court stated in its opinion that the appeal was its “first opportunity to 
review whether a court can deny a Government application under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) after the 
Government has satisfied its burden of proof under that provision, a task that to our knowledge has 
not been performed by any other court of appeals.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 161.  See infra Part V. 
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V.  WHY COURTS SHOULD REJECT A WARRANT REQUIREMENT                   
FOR HISTORICAL CSLI 
A.   The SCA Applies to Historical CSLI 
1.   A Cell Phone Is Not a Tracking Device 
A common argument used by privacy advocates is that the gathering of 
CSLI has the ability to turn a cell phone into a de facto tracking device.162   
Terminology matters here because if a cell phone is a tracking device, the 
government may not be able to use the SCA at all to compel disclosure of 
historical CSLI.163  This is because the SCA specifically excludes tracking 
devices from its definition of an “electronic communication.”164  Thus, to 
obtain historical CSLI, the information must have been stored by an ECS (a 
company that provides electronic communications).165  This has led some to 
argue that historical CSLI—because it originates from what they call a de 
facto tracking device—falls outside the SCA’s authority.166  If this is correct, 
and cell phones are tracking devices and transmit electronic 
communications, there is no other statutory avenue through which the 
government could compel the disclosure of CSLI, leaving law enforcement 
with no other option but to seek a warrant.167  The debate over whether 
modern cell phones are tracking devices is more than just a rhetorical one; in 
fact, if true it has serious implications for law enforcement on the ground 
and the admissibility of evidence in court. 
Some legal precedent suggests that prospective (real time) CSLI is 
considered information from a tracking device,168 but this is another question 
for another article.  In this Comment, the concern is the proper interpretation 
of historical CSLI.  Because historical CSLI can only communicate a 
person’s location at some point in the past, it is less of a threat to privacy and 
 
 162.  See, e.g., Peter J. Sampson, Cellphones Give Feds Insight into Criminal Activity, 
NORTHJERSEY.COM, Jan. 17, 2011, http://www.northjersey.com/news/114072489_Feds_dialed_in_ 
to_criminals.html?c=y&page=2 (“People should be concerned because, whether they realize it or 
not, they’re carrying a tracking device in their pocket.”). 
 163.  See infra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 164.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C) (2006). 
 165.  Id. § 2703(c).  Records from an RCS can also be obtained under this statute.  Id. 
 166.  See, e.g., In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation 
& Use of a Pen Register Device, a Trap & Trace Device, & for Geographic Location Info., 497 F. 
Supp. 2d 301, 310–11 (D.P.R. 2007). 
 167.  Chamberlain, supra note 27, at 1776 (“Because historical CSLI falls squarely within the 
tracking device definition . . . it necessarily falls outside the scope of the SCA.”). 
 168.  See, e.g., 2005 Texas Opinion, supra note 26, at 751 (“While the cell phone was not 
originally conceived as a tracking device, law enforcement converts it to that purpose by monitoring 
cell site data.”). 
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thus less deserving of Fourth Amendment protections.169  An in-depth 
analysis of the SCA demonstrates the veracity of this statement and refutes 
the contention that historical CSLI should be considered information from a 
tracking device at all.170 
For the purpose of the SCA, a tracking device is defined as “an 
electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement 
of a person or object.”171  At first glance, case law would seem to support the 
interpretation that historical CSLI is information obtained from a tracking 
device.172  However, it would be unfair to classify this as the prevailing 
interpretation among courts throughout the country.173  The current debate is 
nicely illustrated by a 2008 case in which a federal magistrate judge in 
Pennsylvania ruled that a warrant was required for the government to 
compel the disclosure of historical CSLI, and in doing so relied heavily on 
her determination that historical CSLI constituted information from a 
tracking device.174  On appeal, the Third Circuit admitted that cell phones 
“resemble” tracking devices, but nonetheless explicitly rejected the lower 
court’s conclusion that historical CSLI was, by definition, information from 
a tracking device.175 
 
 169.  See Koppel, supra note 78, at 1068–69 (discussing historical CSLI’s “limited” value and the 
fact that it produces a “lower level of concern from privacy advocates”). 
 170.  See infra notes 174–90. 
 171.  18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2006). 
 172.  One of the first district courts to issue an order denying a request for CSLI found that not 
only are cell phones easily converted into tracking devices when CSLI is monitored in real time, but 
also noted that cell phones and modern tracking devices actually share much of the same technology.  
2005 Texas Opinion, supra note 26, at 753–56.  This decision has been heavily relied on by courts 
denying requests for historical CSLI on similar grounds.  See, e.g., W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24, 
at 600 n.41. 
 173.  At least one court found no distinction between historical CSLI and any other form of 
business record.  United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, 
at *8 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008).  Others have simply found that historical CSLI does not meet the 
definition of a tracking device.  E.g., In re Application of the United States for an Order for 
Disclosure of Telecomms. Records & Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace, 405 F. 
Supp. 2d 435, 449 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 174.  W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24, at 616. 
 175.  Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 147, at 312–13.  The Third Circuit did not take a strong 
stance on whether or not cell phones were tracking devices, but rather looked beyond that point to 
focus on the privacy issues at play: 
 We cannot reject the hypothesis that CSLI may, under certain circumstances, be used to 
approximate the past location of a person.  If it can be used to allow the inference of 
present, or even future, location, in this respect CSLI may resemble a tracking device 
which provides information as to the actual whereabouts of the subject.  The Knotts/Karo 
opinions make clear that the privacy interests at issue are confined to the interior of the 
home.  There is no evidence in this record that historical CSLI, even when focused on 
cell phones that are equipped with GPS, extends to that realm.  We therefore cannot 
DO NOT DELETE 3/14/2012  2:28 PM 
 
726 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), the critical statute allowing for historical CSLI 
requests, borrows its definition of a tracking device from 18 U.S.C. § 
2510(12)(C).176  However, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 in turn incorporates the 
definition of tracking devices “as defined in section 3117 of this title.”177  
Thus, courts defining cell phones as tracking devices often rely on the 
seemingly unambiguous definition of tracking devices found in subsection 
(b) of 18 U.S.C. § 3117: “an electronic or mechanical device which permits 
the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”178  This definition, 
while simple and straightforward, is incomplete. 
Relying solely on subsection (b) and ignoring subsection (a) of 18 
U.S.C. § 3117 for the definition of a tracking device is incorrect because 
according to well-accepted principles of statutory construction, “[n]o clause, 
sentence or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if a 
construction can be found which will give force to and preserve all the 
words of the statute.”179  This means that 18 U.S.C. § 3117 must be read and 
interpreted as a whole by incorporating subsections (a) and (b) both into the 
definition of a tracking device.180 
18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) states: “If a court is empowered to issue a warrant 
or other order for the installation of a mobile tracking device, such order 
may authorize the use of that device within the jurisdiction of the court, and 
outside that jurisdiction if the device is installed in that jurisdiction.”181  This 
subsection of the statute refers only to the “installation” of a tracking device 
by the government.182  When a request for historical CSLI for a particular 
phone is made, nothing is installed, nor has anything ever been installed on 
that phone by the government.183  In accordance with this line of reasoning, 
several courts have ruled that the SCA’s definition of a tracking device 
 
accept the MJ’s conclusion that CSLI by definition should be considered information 
from a tracking device that, for that reason, requires probable cause for its production. 
Id. 
 176.  18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006) defines several terms used in the chapter containing the SCA. 
 177.  Id. § 2510(12)(C). 
 178.  Id. § 3117(b); see In re Applications of United States for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. 
Code, Section 2703(d) to Disclose Subscriber Info. & Historical Cell Site Info. for Mobile 
Identification Numbers: (XXX) XXX-AAAA, (XXX) XXX-BBBB, & (XXX) XXX-CCCC, 509 F. 
Supp. 2d 64, 76 (D. Mass. 2007) [hereinafter Massachusetts Opinion] (“[H]istoric cell site 
information effectively acts as a ‘real time’ tracking device, as contemplated by the broad definition 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b).”), rev’d sub nom, In re Applications of the United States for Orders 
Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2007). 
 179.  NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 
46:6 (7th ed. 2007). 
 180.  See id. 
 181.  18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  CSLI simply consists of electronic records of 
routine communications between a cell phone and the larger mobile network.  See supra note 43 and 
accompanying text. 
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simply does not, and cannot, apply to cell phones.184  This leads to the 
conclusion that for the purposes of the SCA, cell phones can never be 
considered tracking devices.185 
Most courts have thus far declined to adopt the definition of a “tracking 
device” elucidated above, but have instead ruled that the language in 18 
U.S.C. § 3117(b) alone defines tracking devices under the SCA.186  
Admittedly, when a court restricts itself in this way, it is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that “the definition [of a tracking device] is striking for its 
breadth.”187  However, the crucial language in 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) indicates 
that 18 U.S.C. § 3117 as a whole can only govern devices that must be 
installed, meaning that cell phones necessarily fall well outside that 
definition.188 
2.  A Cell Phone Is a Wire Communication 
Although the tracking device question analyzed above has been a major 
feature in many cases involving CSLI,189 it could be inconsequential when 
 
 184.  See In re Applications of United States for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 
2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 n.11 (D. Mass. 2007) (“The statute governs the ‘installation’ of 
tracking devices.  The ‘tracking’ of a cell phone does not require the installation of any sort of 
device.  The telephone does the job by itself.”); In re Application of the United States for an Order 
for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 461 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Section 3117 speaks only to the ‘installation’ of a tracking device.  Here, the 
government does not seek to install any sort of tracking device, as cell phones provide location 
information on their own by transmitting signals to nearby antenna towers.”). 
 185.  Though courts have been making this argument since as early as 2006, supra note 143, some 
commentators arguing historical CSLI deserves Fourth Amendment protections have neglected to 
give this statutory construction argument any treatment whatsoever.  E.g., Chamberlain, supra note 
27; Koppel, supra note 78.  For example, in his 2009 article, Mr. Chamberlain ignores this argument, 
which is necessarily intertwined with legislative intent, and then later paradoxically calls for 
legislative action.  Chamberlain, supra note 27, at 1788–89.  Before asking Congress to speak again, 
it is prudent to fully explore what Congress has already said on the issue. 
 186.  Massachusetts Opinion, supra note 178, at 74 (citing several district courts that have relied 
on section 3117(b) to adopt a broad definition of tracking devices), rev’d sub nom, In re 
Applications of the United States for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. 
Supp. 2d 76. 
 187.  2005 Texas Opinion, supra note 26, at 753. 
 188.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) (2006). 
 189.  See, e.g., 2010 Texas Opinion, supra note 149, at 578–80 (finding both prospective and 
historical CSLI are information from a tracking device); In re Application of the United States for an 
Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 460 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding historical CSLI is not information from a tracking device); Massachusetts 
Opinion, supra note 178, at 74, rev’d sub nom., In re Applications of the United States for Orders 
Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding 
historical CSLI is information from a tracking device); In re the Application of the United States for 
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determining whether or not the government can use the SCA to obtain 
historical CSLI.190  The Third Circuit, though it seemed to accept the 
possibility that CSLI could be considered information from a tracking 
device,191 explicitly stated that the tracking device question was “irrelevant” 
for the purposes of its analysis.192  The court instead ruled that the 
prohibition against requesting tracking device information does not apply to 
cell phones because cell phones—according to the relevant statutory 
definition—are “wire communications.”193 
The portion of the SCA that the government relies on to compel cell 
phone companies to turn over historical CSLI applies only to ECSs and 
RCSs.194  As discussed in Part II.B. above, when gathering historical CSLI, 
cell phone companies are acting as ECSs.195  An ECS is defined in the SCA 
as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive 
wire or electronic communications.”196  Of course, the definitions for wire 
and electronic communications differ under the SCA,197 and they vary in one 
extremely important way: while the definition of an electronic 
communication specifically excludes tracking devices, the definition of a 
wire communications does not.198 
Courts that have rejected orders to compel disclosure of historical CSLI 
based on the determination that cell phones are tracking devices assume that 
cell phone transmissions constitute electronic communications.199  However, 
 
an Order Authorizing the Installation of a Pen Register Device, a Trap & Trace Device, & for 
Geographic Location Info., 497 F. Supp. 2d 301, 310–11 (D.P.R. 2007) (finding prospective CSLI is 
information from a tracking device); In re Application of the United States for an Order for 
Disclosure of Telecomms. Records & Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace, 405 F. 
Supp. 2d 435, 449–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that historical CSLI is not information from a 
tracking device). 
 190.  See infra notes 191–221. 
 191.  See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 192.  Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 147, at 310 (“[E]ven if the record of a cell phone call does 
indicate generally where a cell phone was used when a call was made, so that the resulting CSLI was 
information from a tracking device, that is irrelevant here because the CSLI derives from a ‘wire 
communication’ and not an ‘electronic communication.’”).  To be clear, the Third Circuit stated the 
tracking device question was irrelevant only to its statutory interpretation analysis.  Id.  The court 
still performed a full Fourth Amendment analysis on the historical CSLI requested in the case and 
found no constitutional violations.  Id. at 311–12. 
 193.  Id. at 310.  This is due to the fact that cell phone transmissions qualify as wire 
communications, and tracking devices are not excluded from wire communications.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
2510(1) (2006). 
 194.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006). 
 195.  See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 196.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006). 
 197.  Compare id. § 2510(1), with id. § 2510(12). 
 198.  Id. § 2510(1), (12). 
 199.  See W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24, at 616 (concluding that because historical CSLI is a 
tracking device it does not fit the definition of an electronic communication and falls outside the 
reach of the SCA).  See also 2010 Texas Opinion, supra note 149, at 575 n.10 (“[T]he SCA limits its 
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as the Third Circuit pointed out, courts taking this position are neglecting to 
consider whether cell phone transmissions fit another definition—wire 
communications.200  Admittedly, it seems bizarre to call cell phone 
transmissions wire communications (since by definition, a cell phone has no 
wires), however, the statutory definitions found in the SCA lead to a 
contrary conclusion.201 
According to the SCA, a wire communication is “any aural transfer 
made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of 
communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between 
the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such 
connection in a switching station).”202  It should be emphasized that by the 
clear language of this statute, wire communications do not necessarily have 
to occur entirely over wires or cables.203  Furthermore, because this 
definition does not exclude tracking devices, it makes no difference whether 
cell phones are considered tracking devices or not.204  Therefore, if cell 
phone transmissions meet the definition of a wire rather than an electronic 
communication, historical CSLI may be obtained under the SCA without 
further inquiry.205 
Calls made or received by cellular phones meet the definition of wire 
communications for two reasons.  First, when making a call, cell phones 
 
application to ‘electronic communications,’ and specifically states that information from tracking 
devices is not an ‘electronic communication.’ . . . CSLI is rather obviously information from a 
‘tracking device’ . . . .”).  This case also lists several other cases that have explicitly found or 
“strongly suggested” that cell phones are tracking devices.  2010 Texas Opinion, supra note 149, at 
578. 
 200.  See Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 147, at 310 (“That historical record is derived from a 
‘wire communication’ and does not itself comprise a separate ‘electronic communication.’  Thus, 
even if the record of a cell phone call does indicate generally where a cell phone was used when a 
call was made, so that the resulting CSLI was information from a tracking device, that is irrelevant 
here because the CSLI derives from a ‘wire communication’ and not an ‘electronic 
communication.’”). 
 201.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006). 
 202.  Id. § 2510(1). 
 203.  The communication must only occur “in part” in such a way as to meet the definition.  Id. 
 204.  Because the SCA specifically excludes tracking devices from the definition of an electronic 
communication, one cannot help but conclude that without this exclusion, nothing would prevent a 
tracking device from being considered an electronic communication.  See id. § 2510(12)(C).  By the 
same logic, since tracking devices are not specifically excluded from the SCA’s definition of a wire 
communication, it leads to the undeniable conclusion that nothing in the SCA prevents a tracking 
device from being considered a wire communication under the right circumstances.  See id. § 
2510(1).  This argument is further bolstered by the fact that both definitions appear in the same 
section of the same chapter of the United States Code.  Id. § 2510(1), (12). 
 205.  Id. § 2510(1). 
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certainly facilitate aural transfers.206  Second, as discussed above, cell 
phones make use of switching stations to connect calls from one cell phone 
to another cell phone or telephone.207  Classifying cell phone calls as wire 
communications is significant because, under the SCA, records (including 
historical CSLI) can be obtained absent a warrant pertaining to either 
electronic communications or wire communications.208  So, as long as 
historical CSLI fits the statutory definition for either of these, the SCA 
applies and the government therefore has the statutory authority to request 
such information.209  Treating cell phone transmissions as electronic 
communications under the SCA has proven to be controversial, but treating 
these transmissions as wire communications is a more appropriate 
classification.210 
Though it may seem strange to classify calls from a cell phone as wire 
communications, this interpretation is not a new one.211  In fact, in addition 
to the Third Circuit, other courts have come to the same conclusion.212  
Moreover, the legislative history suggests that one of Congress’s objectives 
in implementing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in 1986 was to 
broaden the definition of wire communications to include cell phones.213  
Despite all this, some advocates for a probable cause standard in 
applications for historical CSLI insist that calls from a cell phone are 
electronic, rather than wire communications.214  However, these arguments 
are usually based on a highly selective reading of the SCA.215  These 
 
 206.  To qualify as a wire communication, the communication must have some aural component.  
Id. 
 207.  See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 208.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006). 
 209.  Id.  However, even if the government has the statutory authority to request historical CSLI, 
the Fourth Amendment could still require probable cause, because the Fourth Amendment always 
protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 210.  See supra notes 199–209 and accompanying text; infra notes 211–16 and accompanying 
text. 
 211.  See John R. Kreese, Privacy of Conversations over Cordless and Cellular Telephones: 
Federal Protection Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 9 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 335, 342 (1987) (concluding that the 1986 amendment which added language about switching 
stations to the definition of wire communications was intended to bring cell phones under its scope). 
 212.  State v. Serrato, 176 P.3d 356, 360 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007).  In fact, this Oklahoma court 
took its ruling one step further and decided that not only did cell phones fall under the current 
definition of wire communication, but they also fall under the more restrictive definition that 
preceded the current one because, simply, cell phones “use wire and cable connections when 
connecting calls.”  Id. 
 213.  Kreese, supra note 211, at 342. 
 214.  See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 215.  One court clearly misstated the statute when it said the SCA is “limited to information 
pertaining to wire or ‘electronic communications,’ which are expressly defined to exclude 
communications from a device ‘which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.’”  
W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24, at 601.  The judge here did not acknowledge that the definition of 
wire communication does not exclude information from a tracking device.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) 
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arguments fail in light of the overwhelming weight of legal precedent and 
legislative history that clearly indicates that cell phone calls are wire 
communications.216 
There is one last point to address here.  As has already been observed, 
wire communications must involve “aural transfers.”217  This precludes 
CSLI that might be collected when a phone registers with a cell tower, sends 
a text message, or utilizes mobile Internet service because none of these 
involve sound.218  Thus, only CSLI associated with incoming or outgoing 
phone calls could be classified as coming from a wire communication.219  
This problem is easily dealt with by law enforcement, who already 
commonly limit requests for historical CSLI to information that is gathered 
when a person either makes or receives a call.220  This ensures the CSLI is 
gathered as part of a wire communication rather than an electronic 
communication.221 
Regardless of how one analyzes the issue, it is clear that the SCA 
generally, and 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) specifically, applies to historical CSLI.222  
However, the battle being waged over statutory interpretation of the SCA is 
only one piece of the puzzle.  There is another issue at play that is far more 
familiar to and cherished by many Americans: the Fourth Amendment. 
B.   Disclosure of Historical CSLI Is Not a Search Under the Fourth 
Amendment 
Even if the disclosure of historical CSLI can be compelled by the SCA, 
the Fourth Amendment could preclude the disclosure of such information 
without a warrant.223  Warrants may be issued only upon a showing of 
probable cause, a considerably higher standard than the “specific and 
 
(2006).  Commentators have also made this mistake.  One author emphasized the words “wire, cable, 
or other like connection” in section 2510 to support his conclusion that “cellular communications . . . 
clearly are not a form of wire communication.”  Chamberlain, supra note 27, at 1757.  This is 
puzzling, because, as discussed above, the part of the statute that ensures cell phones fall under the 
definition of wire communications is the language about “switching stations.”  See supra note 211. 
 216.  See supra notes 212–13. 
 217.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2006). 
 218.  Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 147, at 310 (finding that CSLI came from a wire 
communication only when a “subscriber makes a cellular phone call”). 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id.  In this case, the government requested CSLI consisting only of information collected 
when the phone in question was either making or receiving a call.  Id. 
 221.  See supra notes 218–19. 
 222.  See supra notes 162–218 and accompanying text. 
 223.  This is a constant refrain among privacy advocates.  See Isikoff, supra note 11, at 40. 
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articulable” facts standard outlined in the SCA.224  So, whether a warrant is 
necessary hinges on whether or not the disclosure of historical CSLI is a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment.  If it is a search, a warrant for that 
information must be obtained upon a showing of probable cause.225  
Application of the two-pronged Katz test226 below shows that the disclosure 
of historical CSLI is not a search.  
1. The First Katz Prong: Do Cell Phone Users Have a Subjective 
Expectation of Privacy in Their Location? 
At one time, courts believed that a physical trespass by law enforcement 
was a prerequisite to finding that a search had occurred under the Fourth 
Amendment.227  Katz v. United States signaled and abandonment of this line 
of thinking when the Court declared that the Fourth Amendment protects 
“people, not places,” and introduced the two prong test used today to 
analyze whether an action is a search.228  The first prong of the test that must 
be satisfied if information is to be protected by the Fourth Amendment is 
whether the person in question has a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
information.229  This prong is typically easily satisfied because the assertion 
that one had a personal expectation of privacy in the information is 
supported by the nearly invisible infrastructure cell phones utilize to provide 
users with service.230   
Although people often do have a subjective expectation of privacy in 
their location, even this subjective expectation is sensitive to contextual 
factors such as where people are and what they happen to be doing with their 
cell phones.231  For instance, if, in the course of a conversation, a person 
explicitly mentions to another party where he is currently located, that 
 
 224.  See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 225.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  Though the general rule is that a search requires a warrant based 
on probable cause, there are a number of exceptions to this requirement.  See generally Warrantless 
Searches and Seizures, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 37, 37–127 (2006) (surveying the 
numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement).  However, courts ruling on requests for historical 
CSLI based on less than probable cause seem to assume that none of these exceptions apply.  See, 
e.g., W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24, at 611 (“It appears to this Court . . . that this information is 
entitled to the judicial-review protections afforded by a probable cause warrant and historically 
applied to movement/location information derived from a tracking device.”). 
 226.  Supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
  227.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967). 
  228.  Id. at 351. 
 229.  See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). 
 230.  See Isikoff, supra note 11, at 40.  Privacy advocate James X. Dempsey claims that most 
people “don’t have a clue” that their cell phone company can track them in real time (or, by 
extension, historically).  Id. 
 231.  See infra notes 232–36 and accompanying text. 
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person cannot claim to have a subjective expectation of privacy.232  
Similarly, GPS devices are used in a host of applications for smartphone 
devices.233  For example, Google Latitude is just one of many applications 
that, if someone chooses, will display her location on a map for all of her 
chosen friends to see either on their smartphone devices or computer.234  
Someone utilizing an application such as this cannot claim any subjective 
expectation of privacy.235  Thus, this prong should not be entirely 
overlooked, as both prongs of the Katz test must be met for behavior to 
qualify as a search under the Fourth Amendment.236 
2. The Second Katz Prong: Is a Cell Phone User’s Expectation of 
Privacy as to That User’s Location Reasonable? 
Assuming that a cell phone user has a subjective expectation of privacy 
in his or her location, that expectation must still be reasonable.237  Although 
the Supreme Court has not provided any guidance when it comes to CSLI 
specifically, the Court did provide some insight in Knotts and Karo into the 
relatively limited circumstances in which a person may have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his or her location.238 
a.   Cell Phone Users Have No Objectively Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy Outside of Private Residences 
In Knotts, the Supreme Court noted that “[n]othing in the Fourth 
Amendment prohibit[s] the police from augmenting the sensory faculties 
bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and 
technology afforded them.”239  Shortly thereafter, the Court in Karo ruled: 
 
 232.  This would fall under the Third Party Doctrine.  See infra notes 264–278 and accompanying 
text. 
 233.  E.g., GPS Phone Carriers Assume Possible Risk and Reward, TARGETED NEWS SERVICE 
(Jan. 7, 2011), http://targetednews.com/pr_disp.php?pr_id=3177171. 
 234.  Google Latitude, GOOGLE MOBILE, http://www.google.com/mobile/latitude/ (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2012). 
 235.  Recall that in Smith v. Maryland, the defendant lost his reasonable expectation of privacy 
because he dialed a number on the telephone.  See supra note 83.  Broadcasting one’s location via a 
phone application would likely have a similar effect. 
 236.  Supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 237.  Supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 238.  See supra notes 88–98 and accompanying text. 
 239.  United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983). 
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We cannot accept the Government’s contention that it should be 
completely free from the constraints of the Fourth Amendment to 
determine by means of an electronic device, without a warrant and 
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a particular 
article—or a person, for that matter—is in an individual’s home at a 
particular time.240 
In making these statements, the Supreme Court gave guidance to law 
enforcement officials using new and advanced forms of electronic 
surveillance—the focus is not on the type of surveillance or how it is used, 
but rather on the target of the surveillance and whether that person is 
observable from a public place.241  This distinction between public and 
private locations is well understood, even by courts that have ruled that 
historical CSLI requests require probable cause: 
Taken together, these cases establish that without a warrant based 
on probable cause the Government may use a tracking device to 
ascertain an individual’s location on a public highway but not in a 
private home, i.e., the public/private dichotomy is the principle 
harmonizing Knotts and Karo, so that a warrant is constitutionally 
required if and only if the location information extends onto private 
property.242 
However, at least one magistrate judge repudiated this well-settled 
distinction between public and private locations when she said: “what an 
individual seeks to preserve as private, and thus free from inspection, though 
it may be in a public area, may nevertheless be outside of the government’s 
reach.”243  This summation of Fourth Amendment protections elevates the 
importance of the first, subjective Katz prong so much so that it eviscerates 
the second, objective prong.244  This is evidenced by the fact that the court 
 
 240.  United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984). 
 241.  “Public place” may be too restrictive.  As long as a law enforcement officer could 
conceivably determine a person’s location “by visual observation made from a spot where one is 
legally permitted to be,” there is no Fourth Amendment violation.  M. Wesley Clark, Cell Phones as 
Tracking Devices, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1413, 1457 (2007).  This logically follows from Knotts and 
Karo, because if someone is exposing his or her location to any member of the general public, courts 
will not recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in that person’s location.  Id. 
 242.  W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24, at 613. 
 243.  Massachusetts Opinion, supra note 178, at 74, rev’d sub nom, In re Applications of the 
United States for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. 
Mass. 2007). 
 244.  See id.  In any Fourth Amendment search analysis, both prongs of the Katz test must be 
satisfied.  See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
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did not analyze the second prong at all in its opinion.245  This court’s 
approach is entirely antithetical to Supreme Court precedent, and worse, has 
been relied on by commentators arguing for a probable cause standard, 
advancing a confusing and unworkable Fourth Amendment interpretation.246 
Proponents of a warrant requirement for obtaining historical CSLI cite 
the Supreme Court of Washington’s State v. Jackson247 decision to advance 
the argument that Fourth Amendment protections can extend into the public 
sphere when surveillance represents an “invasion into private lives” and the 
disclosure of “intimate details.”248  This case carries little weight, however, 
because the Washington State constitution is more protective than the Fourth 
Amendment,249 and nothing in Knotts or Karo suggests expectations of 
privacy as to location extends to the public realm at all.250 
Thus, as the law stands, if a person is observable “from a spot where [a 
law enforcement officer] is legally permitted to be,” no Fourth Amendment 
 
 245.  See Massachusetts Opinion, supra note 178, rev’d sub nom, In re Applications of the United 
States for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 
2007). 
 246.  See Chamberlain, supra note 27, at 1784.  Chamberlain’s argument focuses on a distinction 
between information from one’s past and present, and uses this case in support of his conclusion that 
a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy of presence at a certain location does not vanish simply 
because that person left that location.  Id.  However, the relevant inquiry is not if a reasonable 
expectation of privacy was lost, but rather, if that person ever had it in the first place.  Supra notes 
74–76 and accompanying text.  Contrary to Supreme Court precedent, both Chamberlain and the 
Massachusetts court discussed here assume that “if an individual wishes not to disclose information 
about the destinations to which she will be traveling, that individual maintains a privacy interest in 
guarding against disclosure of those destinations even after having gone to and left them.”  
Chamberlain, supra note 27, at 1784.  However, according to Knotts and Karo, when it comes to 
one’s location, it is what a person does disclose that determines whether the Fourth Amendment has 
been violated, not merely what that person wishes to disclose.  See supra notes 84–102. 
 247.  76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003). 
 248.  See Koppel, supra note 78, at 1075.  In his argument, Koppel inexplicably decides that 
“[t]hough the Jackson court did not rely upon the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment case law, its 
focus on the potential intrusiveness of the technology was entirely consistent with the directive of 
the Katz line of cases.”  Id. at 1074.  This argument is flawed for two reasons.  First, Washington’s 
constitution is more protective than the Fourth Amendment, because it extends protection explicitly 
to one’s “private affairs.”  See supra note 193.  Second, this argument is manifestly inconsistent with 
Knotts, in which the Supreme Court decided that the manner or extent of surveillance is irrelevant as 
long as “[v]isual surveillance . . . would have sufficed to reveal [all facts gathered from technological 
surveillance].”  United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 249.  WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home 
invaded, without authority of law.”).  The Fourth Amendment, of course, does not contain language 
regarding private affairs, but instead guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV. 
 250.  See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
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protections apply.251  The next section explores whether historical CSLI 
represents an invasion of privacy when someone is in an area in which he 
does hold an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. 
b.   Historical CSLI Does Not Intrude upon a Person’s Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy Even when a Person Is in a Private 
Residence 
Many insist that because historical CSLI may communicate to the police 
the contents of a home, the warrantless gathering of this information is a 
search and thus a violation of the Fourth Amendment.252  This is indeed 
problematic because it is clear that people—cell phone users or otherwise—
enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy as to their locations if they are 
within their homes.253  Some have argued that because people typically carry 
their cell phones with them at all times (including while at home), historical 
CSLI “cannot help but implicate the home” and thus should be obtainable 
only with a warrant.254  However, people have an expectation of privacy 
only in things that are on the inside of their homes, and historical CSLI does 
not convey information about the interior of a home.255 
 
 251.  Clark, supra note 241, at 1457. 
 252.  See Chamberlain, supra note 27, at 1788. 
 253.  United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984) (“We cannot accept the Government’s 
contention that it should be completely free from the constraints of the Fourth Amendment to 
determine by means of an electronic device, without a warrant and without probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion, whether a particular article—or a person, for that matter—is in an individual’s 
home at a particular time.” (emphasis added)). 
 254.  Koppel, supra note 78, at 1086–87.  The author goes on to state without supporting authority 
that “it would be exceedingly difficult to only track a suspect while he was outside the home.”  Id. at 
1087.  However, the government often limits the scope of the information it requests from a cell 
phone company.  See Indiana Opinion, supra note 26, at *1 (analyzing a request for CSLI limited to 
information gathered during incoming or outgoing calls).  See also Elise M. Simbro, Comment, 
Disclosing Stored Communication Data to Fight Crime: The U.S. and EU Approaches to Balancing 
Competing Privacy and Security Interests, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 585, 598 (2010) (“[C]ourts 
emphasized the limited scope of the [historical CSLI] requested; law enforcement authorities were 
not seeking to activate GPS capabilities on the target’s phone in order to track the target in real time 
or track the location of the phone when it was not being used.”).  In some situations, the government 
could simply exclude from its request information from any tower within range of the user’s 
residence. 
 255.  In considering the issue of historical CSLI, the Third Circuit recounted the testimony of FBI 
Agent William B. Shute from a different trial.  Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 147, at 311.  In 
analyzing historical CSLI, Agent Shute would only go so far as to say the data indicated that it was 
“highly possible” that the user was at home or that the user was “in the vicinity of her home.”  Id.  
The Third Circuit also acknowledged that Agent Shute would not state that the historical CSLI was 
“reliable evidence” that a user was at home.  Id. at 312.  After recounting this testimony, the Third 
Circuit turned to the case before them and found no evidence that historical CSLI “extends to [the] 
realm” of a private residence.  Id. at 313.  Without question, historical CSLI is strong circumstantial 
evidence that a cell phone user was at or near a certain location at a certain time—otherwise, it 
would have very little value to law enforcement.  Id. at 312 (“CSLI may, under certain 
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In Karo, the beeper was precise enough to “indicate[] that the beeper 
was inside the house.”256  In contrast, as previously discussed, historical 
CSLI can usually indicate the location of a cell phone to within about 200 
feet.257  Unless a person is standing in the middle of a residence and the 
walls are 100 feet away in any direction, his historical CSLI will not be 
precise enough to prove that he is actually inside the walls of the residence 
and secluded from the public eye.258  Even in the best case scenario, a phone 
equipped with a GPS device might be located to within fifty feet, which 
would rarely be precise enough to say with certainty that a phone is located 
within the walls of any residence.259  The most that could be said is that it 
produces a “genuine probability” that the phone is inside the residence.260 
The difference between a high probability and a certainty may seem 
trivial, but the Third Circuit recognized the distinction was “not irrelevant” 
 
circumstances, be used to approximate the past location of a person.”).  However, it is simply not 
precise enough to convey with total certainty the “actual whereabouts” of a person.  See id. 
. 256.  United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984). 
 257.  Supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 258.  In his article, Chamberlain imagines “a cell phone user who, carrying her phone, moves 
from one end of her palatial private residence to another” and states that this imaginary user would 
offend the principles of Karo.  Chamberlain, supra note 27, at 1788.  This would be correct, as long 
as the CSLI indicates a radius entirely within the walls of the residence.  Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.  
However, the average size of a single-family residence in 2001 was 2553 square feet.  Square 
Footage Measurements and Comparisons: Caveat Emptor, EIA: RESIDENTIAL (May 22, 2003), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/recs/sqft-measure.html [hereinafter Square Footage Measurements 
and Comparisons].  In contrast, according to the formula πr2, the area of a circle with a radius of 100 
feet is about 31,416 square feet.  Obviously, houses come in all shapes and sizes, and these 
measurements do not necessarily reflect the considerable variation in possible measurements, but the 
huge difference in coverage area indicates that Chamberlain’s hypothetical “palatial residence” is a 
rare one indeed.  Chamberlain, supra note 27, at 1788.  Thus, in the exceedingly rare situation that 
CSLI does indicate a person is entirely within the walls of a residence, the issue should be litigated 
in the “more appropriate context of a motion to suppress.”  In re Applications of the United States 
for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (D. Mass. 2007).  
As discussed above, cell phones located using their GPS devices can be located much more 
accurately (within fifty feet), which could indicate the presence of a phone entirely within the walls 
of a residence—and thus possibly infringe on a person’s Fourth Amendment rights—with much 
greater frequency than other types of CSLI.  Supra note 55 and accompanying text.  However, law 
enforcement agencies could easily avoid such dangers by simply opting not to request GPS 
information. 
 259.  The average size of a single-family residence in 2001 was 2553 square feet.  Square Footage 
Measurements and Comparisons, supra note 258.  Based on the formula πr2, the area of a circle with 
a radius of fifty feet is about 7853 square feet.  A house would have to be quite large for CSLI to 
actually give information only about the interior of that house. 
 260.  See Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 147, at 311–12 (“The Government correctly notes that 
Agent Shute did not state that the cell-site information ‘is reliable evidence’ that the suspect was at 
home . . . . Agent Shute only stated that it is ‘highly possible’ that the user was at home or in the 
vicinity.”). 
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to its analysis of the Fourth Amendment implications of historical CSLI.261  
This is likely due to Karo, in which the Supreme Court found a Fourth 
Amendment violation because the beeper in that case “reveal[ed] a critical 
fact about the interior of the premises” by signaling to the police that the can 
of ether it was attached to was hidden inside the house.262  Conversely, CSLI 
cannot indicate with certainty anything about the interior of a private 
residence.263  Thus, the Fourth Amendment does not protect historical CSLI, 
and current law does not require a warrant or probable cause to obtain 
historical  CSLI. 
C.  The Third Party Doctrine 
There is one final issue to consider when analyzing whether historical 
CSLI deserves Fourth Amendment protections: the Third Party Doctrine.  In 
United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court defined the scope of this 
doctrine: 
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and 
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information 
is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited 
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be 
betrayed.264 
Thus, if, as some courts have determined, this “Third Party Doctrine” 
applies to CSLI, then the Fourth Amendment is never implicated in cases 
concerning CSLI.265  Courts often hold that the determining factor for 
whether the Third Party Doctrine applies is whether the information is 
“voluntarily” conveyed to the third party.266  Historical CSLI has been 
 
 261.  Id. at 312. 
 262.  United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715, 719 (1984) (emphasis added). 
 263.  Supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 264.  United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
 265.  See, e.g., United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, 
at *8 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (“By voluntarily using the equipment, the cell phone user runs the risk that the 
records concerning the cell phone call will be disclosed to police.”).  Due to this “risk” that the 
information will be turned over to someone else, there is no expectation of privacy in the 
information shared—in this case, historical CSLI.  Id. 
 266.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a 
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.”).  This focus on whether the action is voluntary is crucial in the second prong of the Katz 
test.  See supra note 76.  Without voluntarily conveying information to a third party, a person may 
still expect that information to remain private (due to misplaced trust or a number of other reasons), 
but society would not find that expectation to be reasonable since, of course, the third party would be 
free to share that information with whomever they like.  See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. 
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analogized with other types of personal records, such as bank records, that 
courts have ruled are “voluntarily conveyed” to a third party.267 
Courts requiring a probable cause standard often dismiss the idea that 
the Third Party Doctrine applies because cell phones automatically register 
with cell phone towers and send location information without any voluntary 
action by the user.268  As previously discussed, this is a natural and necessary 
consequence of owning and using a cell phone.269  When the Third Circuit 
ruled on this issue, it stated, “[a] cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ 
shared his location information with a cellular provider in any meaningful 
way.”270  To support this assertion, the court pointed out that cell phone 
users probably do not know that cell phone companies are collecting and 
storing CSLI, and thus users cannot knowingly (much less voluntarily) 
convey such information.271  There are two problems immediately apparent 
in this analysis.  First, because cell phone use costs vary depending on what 
country a cell phone user is in, cell phone users must expect that their cell 
phone company gathers location information with some specificity when 
determining proper billing charges.272  Second, as users become more aware 
of cell phone technology, there will no longer be a widespread lack of 
knowledge regarding the type of location data cell phone companies 
routinely collect.273  If people continue to use their cell phones even after 
 
 267.  Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8 (listing records in which consumers have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy).  Included in that court’s list of analogous cases are: United States 
v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1078 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding people have no expectation of privacy in 
credit card statements); United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486, 1498 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in motel registration records); United States v. Hamilton, 434 F. 
Supp. 2d 974, 979–80 (D. Or. 2006) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in employment 
records); United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393, 1398 (D. Wyo. 1994) (holding there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in kilowatt usage in electricity utility records). 
 268.  See, e.g., 2005 Texas Opinion, supra note 26, at 756. 
 269.  See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 270.  See Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 147, at 317. 
 271.  See id.  The court was persuaded by Electronic Frontier Foundation’s amicus brief that 
argued that cell phone users have no indication when they place a call that their location is being 
gathered and stored.  Id. 
 272.  See, e.g., International Roaming, T–MOBILE: INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, 
http://www.t-mobile.com/International/RoamingOverview.aspx?tp=Inl_Tab_RoamWorldwide (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2012).  This website provides information on the differing rates for cell phone use 
while traveling abroad.  Id. 
 273.  See Matt Hendley, Technology Leads to ‘Surveillance Society,’ STATEPRESS.COM (Oct. 5, 
2010, 10:10 PM), http://www.statepress.com/2010/10/05/technology-leads-to-%E2%80%9C 
surveillance-society%E2%80%9D/.  Gary Merchant, a law professor at Arizona State University, 
noted that the lower your expectation of privacy, the less you are constitutionally protected.  Id.  He 
also noted that while the older generations of Americans find it “creepy” that one might be able to 
track the location of friends via their cell phones, young people “love it.”  Id.  As people start to 
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they learn and understand how historical CSLI is gathered and maintained, 
they will have a much harder time arguing that the CSLI has not been 
voluntarily conveyed.274 
Another reason historical CSLI should be considered voluntarily 
conveyed is that the process of registering or receiving calls (and thus 
conveying CSLI) is easily prevented by turning a cell phone off.275  Some 
commentators have suggested that turning off a cell phone for the purpose of 
retaining one’s privacy is impractical, because “it strips the phone of its 
ability to receive calls,” effectively rendering the device useless for its 
intended purpose.276  However, recall that the only place someone may have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy is inside a home.277  If cell phone users 
turn off their cell phones as they enter their homes to stop broadcasting 
CSLI, they might simply turn to their home telephones or computers for 
their communications needs.278  Given this ability to easily stop the 
transmission of CSLI while at home, the choice to transmit is voluntary and 
thus the Third Party Doctrine applies to bar Fourth Amendment protection. 
VI.  THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF A WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
A.   Technology and Privacy: Strange Bedfellows 
In 1999, Scott McNealy, CEO of computer giant Sun Microsystems, 
famously uttered the startling statement: “You have zero privacy anyway.  
Get over it.”279  He was responding to a question regarding online privacy,280 
and his comments garnered plenty of outrage from the general public.281  
 
expect less privacy in their locations while carrying a cell phone, they lose the ability to mount any 
defense based on the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
 274.  See United States v. Starkweather, No. 91-30354, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 1992).  In 
Starkweather, the Ninth Circuit ruled that electricity bills were not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment because the information contained therein is voluntarily turned over to the utility 
company.  Id.  In reaching this conclusion, the court analogized electricity bills to telephone and 
bank records, stating that “[t]he public awareness that such records are routinely maintained . . . 
negate[s] any constitutionally sufficient expectation of privacy regarding the records.”  Id. at *2 
(quoting Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254, 256 (9th Cir. 1977)). 
 275.  See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 276.  McLaughlin, supra note 50, at 436. 
 277.  See supra note 98. 
 278.  See, e.g., Call Phones from Gmail, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/chat/voice/ (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2012).  With a free Gmail account, a user can call any phone in the United States or Canada 
for free.  Id.  All that is required is an Internet connection.  Id. 
 279.  Luther Martin, Was Scott McNealy Right?, SC MAGAZINE (Feb. 5, 2009), 
http://www.scmagazineus.com/was-scott-mcnealy-right/article/126910/. 
 280.  James Freeman, You Have Zero Privacy . . . Get Over It!, IDEAS IN ACTION WITH JIM 
GLASSMAN (May 15, 2000, 12:00 AM), http://www.ideasinactiontv.com/tcs_daily/2000/05/you-
have-zero-privacyget-over-it.html. 
 281.  Martin, supra note 279. 
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Despite the outrage, Mr. McNealy is not alone in expressing this 
sentiment,282 and there is often a disconnect between what people say they 
want—privacy—and their behavior.283 
This disconnect is especially apparent in today’s cell phone 
technology.284  Many functions on a smartphone utilize location information 
to pinpoint a user’s location for a variety of reasons, including reasons 
indicative of the isolated and lonely nature of modern life, such as a call to 
other lonely strangers for instant company, revelry, or even a romantic 
connection.285  Even more basic cell phone models usually contain some 
location-based technology, such as turn-by-turn road navigation.286  To 
provide these functions, cell phone companies must always determine the 
user’s location to some level of accuracy.287  It is for this reason, perhaps, 
that in a recent poll only 16% of Americans thought that their right to 
privacy was “safe.”288 
 
 282.  Helen A.S. Popkin, Privacy Is Dead on Facebook.  Get Over It, TECHNOTICA ON 
MSNBC.COM (Jan. 13, 2010, 8:56 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34825225/ns/ 
technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/.  Google’s CEO, Eric Schmidt, said in an interview with 
CNBC, “If you have something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing 
it in the first place.”  Id. 
 283.  Martin, supra note 279.  The author points out that consumers have no problem shopping “at 
on-line retailers that keep a record [of] every click of the mouse they make and every web page they 
view.”  Id.  In a recent poll, fifty-five percent of users of geolocation services (those services on a 
cell phone that can be used to share location information with others on the web) said they were 
concerned about the loss of privacy one suffers by using such services.  Sharon Vaknin, Are You 
Worried About Geolocation Privacy?  (Poll), CNET (July 22, 2010, 5:00 AM), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-17938_105-20011282-1.html.  However, even though many of these 
services have features that allow users to keep their locations private (by only broadcasting it to 
specific friends), twenty-nine percent of users do not limit the dissemination of their location 
information at all and allow it to remain entirely public.  Id.  Others choose to limit what they share 
to their private network of friends or family.  Id.  However, even those who believe they are keeping 
their locations private by restricting their activities to “private” networks may be mistaken, as 
geolocation apps often post location updates to social networking sites like Facebook, where 
information can be much less secure.  See id. 
 284.  See infra notes 288–92 and accompanying text. 
 285.  For an interesting but brief overview of location-based dating applications for smartphones, 
see Laurie Davis, Managing Your Love Life from Your Smartphone, EFLIRT EXPERT, 
http://www.eflirtexpert.com/blog/2010/7/20/managing-your-love-life-from-your-smartphone.html 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
 286.  See, e.g., LG Cosmos VN250 (Verizon Wireless), PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/ 
article2/0,2817,2364056,00.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). The Cosmos is an “entry-level phone.”  
Id.  While turn-by-turn navigation is not a standard feature of this phone, customers could pay $9.99 
a month to utilize this service, meaning that every model is equipped with the necessary GPS 
technology.  See id. 
 287.  See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 288.  Joel Roberts, Poll: Privacy Rights Under Attack, CBS NEWS: OPINION (Feb. 11, 2009, 7:06 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/30/opinion/polls/main894733.shtml. 
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In the same poll, 83% of Americans expressed a negative opinion about 
companies’ collection of customers’ personal information,289 and yet many, 
if not most Americans routinely share all sorts of information with private 
companies about their private lives, preferences, and even locations.290  Most 
major grocery chains now have discount card programs that serve the real 
purpose of collecting data about consumers.291  Online retailers, such as 
Amazon.com, may automatically track consumers’ purchases, the operating 
system a consumer is using to access their site, and even the number of 
mouse clicks a consumer performed while browsing the website.292  While 
information from grocery store discount cards or online purchases could 
likely reveal a person’s past location (because they need to either be present 
at a store or using a computer to make purchases), it would have little chance 
of obtaining Fourth Amendment protection due to the Third Party 
Doctrine.293  Paradoxically, courts have singled out historical CSLI as a type 
of business record that does deserve the full protection of the Fourth 
Amendment.294 
Last year, Mark Zuckerberg, Founder and CEO of the most popular 
social networking site in the world, Facebook, made the decision to make 
much of a Facebook user’s information publicly available.295  In response to 
questions about the wisdom of such a decision, Mr. Zuckerberg said, “We 
view it as our role in the system to constantly be innovating and be updating 
what our system is to reflect what the current social norms are.”296  While 
one might argue that Facebook is itself driving social change, it seems clear 
nonetheless that society is changing and Americans’ private lives are much 
less private.297  Whether this is a desirable social change is debatable, but 
 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  See infra notes 295–96. 
 291.  Katy McLaughlin, The Discount Grocery Cards That Don’t Save You Money, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 21, 2003, http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1043006872628231744,00.html. 
 292.  Amazon.com Privacy Notice, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/ 
display.html/ref=footer_privacy?ie=UTF8&nodeId=468496 (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
 293.  See supra note 267. 
 294.  Isikoff, supra note 11, at 40. 
 295.  Marshall Kirkpatrick, Facebook’s Zuckerberg Says the Age of Privacy Is Over, 
READWRITEWEB (Jan. 9, 2010, 9:25 PM) http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/facebooks_ 
zuckerberg_says_the_age_of_privacy_is_ov.php.  The move made every user’s “name, profile 
picture, gender, current city, networks, Friends List, and all the pages you subscribe to . . . publicly 
available information on Facebook.”  Id. 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  See id.  The author takes a rather strong stand against Zuckerberg’s statements, saying, “I 
don’t buy Zuckerberg’s argument that Facebook is now only reflecting the changes that society is 
undergoing. I think Facebook itself is a major agent of social change and by acting otherwise 
Zuckerberg is being arrogant and condescending.”  Id.  However, while this amounts to arguing over 
whether the chicken or the egg came first, the author does not deny that society has changed.  Id.  
Notably, not all analysts see the “death of privacy” as a negative occurrence.  See Tim Leberecht, 
Privacy Is Over.  Here Comes Sociality, POP!TECH (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.poptech.org/blog/ 
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because of the increased use of technology to share personal information, 
instituting a warrant requirement for historical CSLI may result in arbitrarily 
providing Fourth Amendment protections to one realm of people’s electronic 
lives while threatening an important government interest in providing for the 
safety of the public.298 
B.   The Value of Historical CSLI to Law Enforcement 
It should come as no surprise that law enforcement views CSLI as a 
valuable investigatory tool.299  In response to the “overwhelming” need for 
CSLI evidence, the FBI has formed a unit called the Cellular Analysis and 
Survey Team, the sole function of which is to “provide[] technical 
assistance, case support and training to federal, state and local law 
enforcement officers around the nation.”300  This sort of support is likely 
needed to deal with the “thousands” of requests for CSLI made nationwide 
every month.301 
While thousands of ex parte requests for cell phone records may seem 
ominous, law enforcement officers are doing important and valuable things 
with these requests.302  There are hundreds if not thousands of examples of 
 
privacy_is_over_here_comes_sociality.  Bill Thompson, Technology writer for BBC News Online, 
said the following about the new social norms: 
The enlightenment idea of privacy is breaking apart under the strain of new technologies, 
social tools and the emergence of the database state.  We cannot hold back the tide, but 
we can use it as an opportunity to rethink . . . how we engage and interact with others and 
where the boundaries can be put between the public and private.  Those of us who are 
ahead of the curve when it comes to the adoption and use of technologies that undermine 
the old model of privacy . . . can offer advice and support to those who might be unhappy 
to have their movements, eating habits, friendships and patterns of media consumption 
made available to all.  But every [social media user] is sharing more data with more 
people than even the FBI under Hoover or the Stasi at the height of its powers could have 
dreamed of.  And we do so willingly, hoping to benefit in unquantifiable ways from this 
unwarranted—in all senses—disclosure. 
Id. 
 298.  See supra note 281 and accompanying text.  See also infra notes 303–12. 
 299.  See infra notes 303–12. 
 300.  Sampson, supra note 162, at A01. 
 301.  Isikoff, supra note 11, at 40. 
 302.  For example, law enforcement has used historical CSLI to locate a hiker that almost died of 
hypothermia.  Police Track Cellphone Signal to Find After-Hours Hiker, CANADA.COM (Mar. 1, 
2011), http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/westcoastnews/story.html?id=c55324c1-13c6-
4cca-8708-9f9efb9f2360.  In addition, law enforcement recently uncovered a possible human 
trafficking scheme due entirely to one man’s partial cell phone call.  Call Leads to Possible Human 
Trafficking Scheme, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, June 17, 2011, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/ 
jun/17/call-leads-to-possible-human-trafficking-scheme.  The call was dropped before the man, who 
claimed he was being held against his will, could tell the police where he was located.  Id.  
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the government utilizing historical CSLI to obtain convictions or locate 
criminal suspects.303  Historical CSLI is particularly helpful when suspects 
are using prepaid cell phones, or when dealing with a criminal who 
otherwise knows how to “cover his tracks.”304 
Requiring a warrant every time police wish to use historical CSLI would 
only serve to slow down and frustrate the efforts of officers, who would 
have to gather more information to meet the more stringent probable cause 
standard.305  It has been said that “the Fourth Amendment seeks to balance 
degrees of intrusion on our civil liberties against degrees of promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests.”306  As already discussed, the degree of 
intrusion by the government when it requests historical CSLI is minimal,307 
yet the governmental interest in using this information to deter crime and 
catch criminals is extremely compelling.308 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Government today is often portrayed as the oppressive “Big Brother”: 
cold, uncaring, and without any respect for individual privacy rights.309  This 
characterization is so pervasive, it is even advanced by major news 
 
Fortunately, cell phone records led police to the house from which the call came.  Id.  Finally, a FBI 
special agent had this to say about historical CSLI: “I use it every day and have used it to find 
hundreds of people . . . .  The agents that I have trained have used it to find thousands of people.”  
Sampson, supra note 162. 
 303.  In a recent murder trial, historical CSLI was considered to be “important evidence” by jurors 
discussing the case after handing down a guilty verdict.  Terry Katz, Following Guilty Verdict, Jury 
Members Discuss the Trial, STURGISJOURNAL.COM (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.sturgisjournal.com/ 
community/centreville/x2011262879/Following-guilty-verdict-jury-members-discuss-the-trial.  
Prosecutors used historical CSLI to prove two parents were not at home asleep, as they claimed, 
when seven of their four-month-old’s fingers were chewed off by a pet ferret.  Parents of Ferret 
Attack Victim Charged, KSALLINK.COM (June 16, 2011), http://www.ksallink.com/ 
?cmd=displaystory&story_id=17894&format=html.  In another investigation in Kentucky, the 
suspected sole survivor of a three man shootout during a home invasion claimed he was not at the 
crime scene on the night in question, but his historical CSLI indicated otherwise.  Deadly Home 
Invasion Case Sent to Grand Jury, KYPOST.COM (June 13, 2011), http://www.kypost.com/dpp/news/ 
state/Home-InvasionShooting_17400962. 
 304.  Sampson, supra note 162. 
 305.  Id. (“[The SCA’s standard] is a much lower burden than the probable cause standard 
required under the Fourth Amendment.”).  For a helpful and concise chart explaining the different 
evidentiary standards that police must meet under different circumstances, see Orin S. Kerr, Internet 
Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 620 
(2003).  To obtain a warrant, the government must establish “a likelihood that a crime has occurred 
and that evidence of the crime exists in the location to be searched,” while a “specific and articulable 
facts” court order does not require the government to establish a likelihood of anything, and the 
information must be relevant to the investigation, rather than the crime itself.  Id. 
 306.  W.D. Pa. Opinion, supra note 24, at 591. 
 307.  See supra Part V. 
 308.  See supra note 302 and accompanying text. 
 309.  Isikoff, supra note 11, at 40. 
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outlets.310  With so much negativity directed toward government action, it is 
difficult to discern when the government gets it right. 
However, Congress has, in the SCA, created a workable test that both 
protects citizens and provides for the evolving needs of law enforcement 
agencies.  As a threat to constitutional privacy rights, historical CSLI has a 
bark that is far worse than its bite.  Lately, courts and commentators alike 
have been quick to jump to the conclusion that a warrant must be required 
before the government can access historical CSLI.  These viewpoints seem 
to be grounded in either a misinterpretation of the statutes that make up the 
SCA or a vague, but unfounded, belief that this sort of information just feels 
like it should be protected by the Fourth Amendment.311  While it is 
imperative that courts help to protect the privacy of people within the United 
States, a warrant requirement could frustrate the efforts of law enforcement 
agencies while at the same time extending Fourth Amendment protections to 
information in which people have no reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Neither of these results should be palatable to the courts, to law 
enforcement, or to the public at large.  In the future, courts should grant 
requests for historical CSLI as long as the “specific and articulable facts” 
standard imposed by the SCA312 has been met by the government. 
Kyle Malone* 
 
 
 310.  On his Fox News program Glenn Beck spoke directly to the issue of historical CSLI and the 
Third Circuit’s decision not to require a warrant for historical CSLI: “The FBI and other agencies 
will now no longer need a search warrant to track your location.  They’ll use your cell phone.  
Nobody is going to a judge.”  The Glenn Beck Program (Fox News Network broadcast Sept. 27, 
2010).  This small bit of misinformation (18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006) does require the government to 
obtain an order from a judge to gain access to CSLI) only serves to fuel the flames of discontent 
among the public, and shows little appreciation for the delicate balance between individual rights 
and the needs of law enforcement that courts must attempt to maintain. 
 311.  See Third Circuit Opinion, supra note 147, at 308.  The court recognized that the issue of 
privacy rights is an emotional one, even to judges, “The MJ erred in allowing her impressions of the 
general expectation of privacy of citizens to transform [the standard outlined in the SCA to a 
probable cause standard].”  Id. 
 312.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006). 
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